State v. Jarnagin
277 P.3d 535, 351 Or. 703, 2012 WL 1437302 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence derived from a Miranda violation is suppressible if it is a direct product of the unwarned statement, such as a reenactment that memorializes the statement. However, belated Miranda warnings can purge the taint of a prior violation and render subsequent statements admissible if, under the totality of the circumstances, the warnings effectively provide the suspect with a genuine choice to waive their rights.
Facts:
- On July 7, 2009, defendant J.L.S. was caring for his girlfriend Kari's eight-month-old daughter, Aleeha, when she appeared to have a seizure.
- Aleeha was hospitalized with severe injuries, including skull fractures, healing rib fractures, a split liver, and a bruised spleen.
- On the afternoon of July 7, detectives questioned J.L.S. for over two hours at the police station without Miranda warnings; he eventually claimed Aleeha fell in the bathtub.
- Later that evening at the hospital, detectives confronted J.L.S. about the extent of Aleeha's injuries, again without Miranda warnings.
- During the hospital interrogation, J.L.S. changed his story, claiming Aleeha had slipped from his grasp in the kitchen, hit her head on a cabinet, and then fallen to the floor.
- At the end of the hospital interview, J.L.S. agreed to participate in a video reenactment of the kitchen fall story the following day.
- Around noon on July 8, officers went to J.L.S.'s home and videotaped him reenacting the sequence of events he had described at the hospital.
- A few hours later on July 8, J.L.S. went to the police station for a polygraph examination, where he read and signed a consent form that included Miranda warnings before making further statements.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged J.L.S. with murder by abuse and other related crimes.
- J.L.S. filed a pretrial motion in the trial court to suppress statements made on July 7 and July 8, alleging violations of Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution.
- The trial court suppressed the statements from the mid-point of the July 7 police station interview and the entire July 7 hospital interview due to the absence of Miranda warnings in compelling circumstances.
- The trial court also suppressed the July 8 video reenactment as tainted by the prior day's violations.
- The trial court ruled the July 8 prepolygraph statements were admissible due to a valid waiver, but suppressed the post-polygraph statements, finding the circumstances had become compelling again.
- The State, as appellant, appealed the suppression of the video reenactment and the post-polygraph statements directly to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
- J.L.S., as cross-appellant, appealed the admission of his prepolygraph statements.
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Issue:
Under Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution, must a defendant's statements made during a video reenactment and during a subsequent polygraph examination be suppressed as the product of unwarned, compelling interrogations that occurred the previous day?
Opinions:
Majority - Kistler, J.
Yes, as to the video reenactment; No, as to the pre- and post-polygraph statements. Statements from a video reenactment must be suppressed when the unwarned statements from a prior Miranda violation serve as the 'script' for the reenactment, making it a direct product of the constitutional breach. However, subsequent statements made after belated but effective Miranda warnings are admissible if the warnings, considered under the totality of the circumstances, provided the defendant a genuine choice about whether to speak further. Here, the video reenactment directly memorialized the unwarned hospital statements and was thus tainted. In contrast, the statements made in connection with the polygraph were not tainted. There was a significant break in time, a change in personnel and setting, and the defendant had not previously confessed to intentional harm. Most importantly, the defendant read, signed, and verbally affirmed his understanding of the Miranda rights on the consent form, which was sufficient to break the causal chain and ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver for both his pre- and post-polygraph statements.
Concurring - De Muniz, C. J.
Yes, I concur with the majority's reasoning and outcome. However, the lack of a standardized, legally prescribed polygraph consent form in Oregon creates unnecessary ambiguity that can lead to protracted litigation. The form used here, and the examiner's accompanying comments, could easily be interpreted as downplaying the significance of the Miranda rights, suggesting they only apply to individuals already in custody. While the defendant in this specific case demonstrated a clear understanding of his rights, the potential for confusion in other cases is high. Adopting a uniform, clear consent form would enhance the clarity of defendants' rights and reduce avoidable legal disputes and costs.
Analysis:
This case refines Oregon's approach to derivative evidence following a Miranda violation under Article I, section 12. It establishes a clear distinction between evidence that is a direct exploitation of the violation versus evidence obtained after a break in the causal chain. The court effectively adopts the analytical framework from the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Missouri v. Seibert and Oregon v. Elstad to determine the effectiveness of belated warnings, focusing on whether the suspect is given a 'genuine choice.' The ruling provides law enforcement with guidance that while an initial Miranda failure is not necessarily fatal to a subsequent confession, they cannot simply memorialize an unwarned statement; a clean break and effective, subsequent warnings are required to cure the taint.
