State v. Jama
908 N.W.2d 372 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
The crime of indecent exposure is a general-intent crime, which only requires a voluntary and intentional act of exposure, not an intent to cause a particular result. Consequently, the statutory defense of voluntary intoxication is unavailable, and a defendant must make a specific prima facie showing to be entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of involuntary intoxication.
Facts:
- Mohamed Musa Jama met several men and smoked what he believed to be shisha, a flavored tobacco, from a hookah with them.
- After smoking the substance, Jama testified he felt dizzy, disoriented, vomited, and eventually blacked out with no memory of subsequent events.
- On July 5, 2015, Jama approached a family gathered in their front yard.
- Jama exposed his penis and danced provocatively in front of multiple family members, including three children under the age of 16.
- Witnesses and the arresting officer observed that Jama appeared to be intoxicated, drugged, and nonresponsive during and after the incident.
- No tests were conducted to determine what, if any, substances Jama had ingested.
- Jama testified he had never previously experienced such a severe reaction to smoking shisha.
Procedural Posture:
- Mohamed Musa Jama was charged with one count of gross misdemeanor indecent exposure in a Minnesota district court (the trial court).
- Prior to trial, the defense moved to rely on the defenses of voluntary and involuntary intoxication.
- The district court denied the use of the voluntary intoxication defense, ruling that indecent exposure is a general-intent crime.
- The court permitted the defense to argue involuntary intoxication but required a prima facie showing of its elements.
- At the conclusion of the evidence, Jama requested a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication.
- The district court denied the request, finding Jama had failed to make the required prima facie showing.
- A jury found Jama guilty, and he was convicted of gross misdemeanor indecent exposure.
- Jama (as appellant) appealed his conviction to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Is the crime of indecent exposure a general-intent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is unavailable and for which a defendant must provide sufficient evidence to merit a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication?
Opinions:
Majority - Cleary, Chief Judge
Yes, indecent exposure is a general-intent crime, making the defense of voluntary intoxication unavailable and requiring a substantial evidentiary showing for an involuntary intoxication defense. The statute's use of the word 'willfully' requires only a general intent—a voluntary and knowing act—rather than a specific intent to cause a particular result. Therefore, the statutory defense of voluntary intoxication, which applies only to specific-intent crimes, is not available. Furthermore, the court did not err in denying a jury instruction on the common-law defense of involuntary intoxication because Jama failed to make a prima facie showing on its required elements. He offered only speculation, not evidence, that he was tricked into consuming an intoxicating substance, could not prove what substance caused his intoxication, and his actions upon police arrival (attempting to conceal himself) indicated he knew his conduct was wrong.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies that indecent exposure in Minnesota is a general-intent crime, significantly narrowing the defenses available to defendants. By confirming this classification, the court forecloses the use of the voluntary intoxication defense, a common tactic in cases involving alcohol or drugs. The ruling also reinforces the high evidentiary threshold for the involuntary intoxication defense, requiring more than the defendant's own testimony and speculation. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to excuse criminal conduct by claiming intoxication unless they can provide concrete evidence to support an involuntary intoxication claim.
