State v. Jacobson
2017 WL 2118655, 526 S.W.3d 228, 2017 Mo. App. LEXIS 435 (2017)
Rule of Law:
An armed criminal action conviction, which requires a knowing or purposeful mental state for the use of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon, can be based on an underlying felony that only requires criminal negligence. A motor vehicle can constitute a 'dangerous instrument' if it is knowingly operated under circumstances where it is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
Facts:
- On January 13, 2015, Andrew Jacobson, 18 years old, began drinking alcohol alone at 2:00 a.m.
- At approximately 3:00 p.m., Jacobson picked up a friend in his 'lifted' Toyota truck, and they subsequently drove to a lake to drink rum mixed with soda.
- Around 5:30 p.m., Jacobson drove his truck to a Slater High School basketball game while intoxicated and parked in a gravel lot.
- Approximately an hour after arriving, Jacobson, recognizing his intoxication, left the school alone in his truck.
- Olivia Knox (Victim), holding her nine-month-old daughter, was crossing a street near the high school gym when Jacobson's truck, after pulling out of a parking lot, rolled over her back, causing her spinal and rib fractures and other injuries.
- Jacobson felt a bump, thought he had hit a dog, slowed down, looked back, and then sped away without stopping, despite being aware that the intersection was a high-traffic area for pedestrians and that his lifted truck altered his line of sight.
- Law enforcement found Jacobson's pickup truck at his home, matching bystander descriptions, and located a baby hat belonging to the Victim's daughter stuck in the front grill.
- Jacobson's BAC was .177 at 7:43 p.m., and he later admitted he had been drinking since 2:00 a.m. and was intoxicated while driving to and from the high school.
Procedural Posture:
- Andrew Jacobson was charged in the Circuit Court of Saline County with endangering the welfare of a child, leaving the scene of an accident, second-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action.
- A jury in the Circuit Court of Saline County found Jacobson guilty of one count of second-degree assault and one related count of armed criminal action, while acquitting him of the other charges.
- The jury recommended a sentence of one year in county jail for assault in the second degree and three years for armed criminal action.
- Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, the Circuit Court of Saline County (trial court) sua sponte (on its own motion) entered a judgment of acquittal for the armed criminal action count at the time of sentencing.
- Jacobson was sentenced to one year in the county jail for second-degree assault.
- The State of Missouri (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment of acquittal for the armed criminal action count to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence exist to support a jury's conviction for armed criminal action, requiring a knowing use of a dangerous instrument, when the underlying felony (second-degree assault) requires only criminal negligence, and when the instrument used is a motor vehicle operated under highly intoxicated and dangerous circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Gary D. Witt, Judge
Yes, there was sufficient evidence to support Jacobson's conviction for armed criminal action. The trial court erred on both grounds for vacating the jury's verdict. First, the trial court erred in concluding that an underlying felony requiring criminal negligence cannot serve as the basis for an armed criminal action charge, which requires a knowing or purposeful mental state. Citing State v. Belton, the Missouri Supreme Court unequivocally established that the armed criminal action statute applies to 'any felony,' making the culpable mental state of the underlying felony irrelevant. A defendant can act negligently in the underlying felony but knowingly in the armed criminal action. This principle applies equally regardless of whether a 'deadly weapon' or 'dangerous instrument' is used, as the statute makes no such distinction. Second, the trial court erred in finding insufficient evidence that Jacobson's truck was a 'dangerous instrument.' A vehicle qualifies as a dangerous instrument when used in circumstances readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury. The State need not prove an intent to cause injury but rather that the defendant 'knowingly used [his] vehicle in a manner or under circumstances in which it was readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.' The evidence demonstrated Jacobson's severe intoxication, his operation of a lifted truck that obstructed his view, loud music, driving at night in a known high-pedestrian traffic area (between games), his awareness of hitting 'something' and driving over it with his back tires, and his subsequent flight and lies to police. These 'extensive attendant circumstances' cumulatively provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Jacobson knowingly used his vehicle as a dangerous instrument. The court clarified that not every intoxicated driving accident resulting in injury will automatically support an armed criminal action conviction, but the 'unusual facts of this case' did.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle in Missouri that the mental state for an armed criminal action charge is independent of the underlying felony, reinforcing that a defendant can have a lesser mental state for the felony but a 'knowing' mental state for the use of the weapon/instrument. It also provides crucial guidance on when a motor vehicle can be considered a 'dangerous instrument,' emphasizing that the mere fact of an intoxicated driving accident is insufficient; instead, specific, egregious attendant circumstances demonstrating a knowing operation in a manner readily capable of causing serious harm are required. This clarity helps differentiate simple negligent driving from aggravated conduct warranting an additional felony charge, impacting future prosecutions involving vehicles as dangerous instruments.
