State v. Jackson
344 So. 2d 961 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
Accepting a share of stolen goods in exchange for an agreement not to report a felony does not constitute the crime of being an accessory after the fact. This crime requires a personal, affirmative act of aiding the felon to help them avoid arrest or punishment, which is distinct from the separate offenses of compounding a felony or receiving stolen property.
Facts:
- On September 22, 1974, Roy Jackson encountered three acquaintances who told him they were planning to break into a local bar and pool hall.
- After learning of their plan, Jackson departed.
- The next day, Jackson learned that the bar and three other nearby establishments had been burglarized.
- Jackson later found the three men and told them he knew they had committed the burglaries.
- The men agreed to give Jackson a 'cut of the money' if he would not report them to the authorities.
- The burglars then gave Jackson $87.00 in quarters and seven packages of cigarettes, which were proceeds from the burglaries.
- Jackson later exchanged the quarters for bills for his own use.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Roy Jackson in a Louisiana trial court with being an accessory after the fact to simple burglary.
- Following a trial, a jury found Jackson guilty as charged.
- The trial court sentenced Jackson to two years of imprisonment.
- Jackson appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, arguing there was no evidence to support the conviction.
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Issue:
Does accepting a portion of the proceeds from a burglary, in exchange for an agreement not to report the crime, constitute 'harboring, concealing, or aiding the offender' under Louisiana's accessory after the fact statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Sanders
No. Accepting stolen goods for an agreement not to report a felony does not make one an accessory after the fact. The statute requires evidence that the defendant personally harbored, concealed, or aided the felon with the specific intent of preventing their apprehension and punishment. Jackson's conduct falls under the separate crimes of compounding a felony (accepting something of value for an agreement not to reveal a felony) and receiving stolen things. The court reasoned that being an accessory after the fact requires giving direct, personal assistance to the fugitive felon—such as providing a car, food, or shelter to help them escape. Merely failing to report a crime, even for remuneration, does not satisfy the statutory requirement of personally aiding the offender to evade justice.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly construes the 'aid' element of the accessory after the fact statute, establishing a clear distinction between personally assisting a felon and profiting from their crime through silence. It clarifies that conduct which might constitute compounding a felony or receiving stolen property does not automatically satisfy the elements for being an accessory. The ruling forces prosecutors to be more precise in their charging decisions, requiring them to prove an affirmative act of personal assistance to the offender, rather than merely a failure to report or a passive benefit from the crime.
