State v. Jackowski
2006 Vt. 119, 181 Vt. 73 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
When a criminal statute requires an act be done "with intent," which is synonymous with the Model Penal Code's "purposely" standard, it is a reversible error for a trial court to instruct the jury that intent can be established if the defendant acted "knowingly" by being "practically certain" their conduct would cause the prohibited result. Such an error is not harmless when the defendant's intent is the central contested issue at trial.
Facts:
- On March 20, 2003, Rosemarie Jackowski participated in an anti-war demonstration at a public intersection.
- Jackowski and eleven other protesters blocked vehicular traffic at the intersection for approximately fifteen minutes.
- While blocking traffic, Jackowski stood in the intersection, praying and holding a sign with anti-war slogans and newspaper clippings.
- Police officers repeatedly asked Jackowski to leave the intersection, and she refused to do so.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Rosemarie Jackowski with disorderly conduct in a Vermont trial court.
- The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Jackowski's protest sign from evidence.
- The trial court partially granted the motion, allowing the sign to be shown to the jury but not admitted into evidence or taken into the jury room.
- After a one-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict, convicting Jackowski of disorderly conduct.
- Jackowski (appellant) appealed her conviction to the Vermont Supreme Court, with the State as appellee, arguing the jury instructions on intent were improper and the exclusion of her sign was an error.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction that permits a conviction for disorderly conduct under a statute requiring "intent" if the defendant acted "knowingly"—that is, was "practically certain" her actions would cause public inconvenience—constitute reversible error when intent is the only contested issue at trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, J.
Yes. A jury instruction that conflates the distinct mental states of "intent" (purposely) and "knowingly" is a reversible error when the statute requires the higher standard of intent. The Vermont legislature adopted the Model Penal Code's (MPC) distinction between these mental states, where "with intent" means it was the defendant's "conscious object" to cause the result, not merely that the defendant was "practically certain" the result would occur. Because intent was the only contested issue at trial and Jackowski presented evidence disputing her intent to cause public annoyance, the erroneous instruction improperly lowered the State's burden of proof and cannot be considered harmless error as it effectively removed the key element from the jury's consideration.
Dissenting - Burgess, J.
No. Although the jury instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the conviction should be upheld. The evidence of Jackowski's intent to cause public inconvenience was overwhelming, as she admitted she was aware her actions were causing annoyance and consciously chose to continue that conduct after police requested her to stop. Given these admissions, any rational jury would have found the requisite intent even under the correct "purposely" standard, making the instructional error inconsequential to the verdict and harmless.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the adoption of the Model Penal Code's hierarchy of mental states (mens rea) in Vermont criminal law, specifically reinforcing the critical distinction between acting "purposely" and acting "knowingly." It establishes that when a statute specifies "intent," courts must instruct juries on the higher "purposely" standard of "conscious object" and cannot substitute the lower "knowingly" standard. The decision also sets a high bar for finding harmless error in cases of incorrect jury instructions on mens rea, holding that such an error cannot be harmless when the defendant's state of mind is the central, disputed element of the offense.
