State v. J.P.
907 So.2d 1101, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 2529 (2004)
Rule of Law:
The Florida Constitution's explicit right to privacy and the right to intrastate freedom of movement are fundamental rights for minors; therefore, juvenile curfew ordinances must satisfy strict scrutiny by serving a compelling governmental interest and being narrowly tailored through the least intrusive means.
Facts:
- The City of Tampa enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance.
- The City of Pinellas Park enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance, similar to Tampa's.
- J.P. was present in a public place in Tampa during curfew hours, violating the Tampa ordinance.
- T.M., A.N., and D.N. were present in public places in Pinellas Park during curfew hours, violating the Pinellas Park ordinance.
- The Pinellas Park ordinance prohibited individuals under eighteen years of age from being in public places between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on weekdays, and 12:01 a.m. through 6:00 a.m. on weekends, with enumerated exceptions (e.g., parental accompaniment, employment, First Amendment activities, emergency errands).
- The Tampa ordinance applied to persons under seventeen years of age, had slightly different exceptions (e.g., nonemergency errands with written parental approval), and included provisions for business owners.
- Both ordinances prescribed initial warnings but allowed for criminal penalties, including fines and potential incarceration or commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, for subsequent violations.
Procedural Posture:
- The State Attorney’s Office filed petitions for delinquency against J.P. (for violating Tampa's ordinance) and T.M., A.N., and D.N. (for violating Pinellas Park's ordinance).
- In J.P.'s case, the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges, after which J.P. pled no contest, reserving the right to appeal the denial.
- In the case of T.M., A.N., and D.N., the trial court granted their motions to dismiss, finding the Pinellas Park ordinance unconstitutional.
- The losing parties appealed these trial court decisions to the Second District Court of Appeal: J.P. (appellant) appealed the denial of his motion, and the State (appellant) appealed the dismissal of charges against T.M., A.N., and D.N.
- The Second District Court of Appeal, applying intermediate scrutiny, initially ruled both the Tampa and Pinellas Park ordinances constitutional.
- The Second District Court of Appeal then certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court, including the appropriate level of scrutiny and the ordinances' constitutionality.
- The Florida Supreme Court (in T.M. v. State, 784 So.2d 442 (Fla.2001) and J.P. v. State, 788 So.2d 953 (Fla.2001)) held that strict scrutiny applied to juvenile curfew ordinances, quashed the Second District's decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings under the strict scrutiny standard.
- On remand, the Second District Court of Appeal applied strict scrutiny and concluded that both the Tampa and Pinellas Park juvenile curfew ordinances were unconstitutional.
- Following this, the Second District Court of Appeal certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the juvenile curfew ordinances.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a juvenile curfew ordinance that burdens minors' fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of movement, by broadly prohibiting their presence in public during certain hours and imposing criminal penalties, satisfy strict scrutiny under the Florida Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Quince
No. The juvenile curfew ordinances enacted by the cities of Tampa and Pinellas Park are unconstitutional because, while they serve a compelling governmental interest, they are not narrowly tailored to achieve those interests through the least intrusive means. The Court reaffirmed that strict scrutiny applies to juvenile curfew ordinances, citing the precedent set in previous reviews of these cases (T.M. v. State, 2001; J.P. v. State, 2001) and emphasizing the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court identified that the ordinances implicate minors' fundamental rights to privacy under Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution, and their right to intrastate freedom of movement, both of which are fundamental under Florida law. While acknowledging the cities' compelling governmental interests in reducing juvenile crime, protecting juveniles from victimization, and promoting parental control, the Court found that the ordinances failed the 'narrowly tailored' prong of strict scrutiny. This failure was due to two main reasons: 1) the broad coverage of the curfews, which prohibited otherwise innocent and legal conduct by minors, even with parental permission, and applied city-wide without specific justification for such expansive scope; and 2) the imposition of criminal sanctions (incarceration and fines) for curfew violations on juveniles and their parents (and business operators in Tampa), which the Court deemed not to be the least intrusive means, especially when compared to the state's model civil infraction penalties. The Court declined to rule on whether the ordinances implicated parental rights, citing standing issues.
Dissenting - Justice Wells
Justice Wells joined Justice Cantero's dissent. He argued that the majority's reliance on stare decisis regarding the application of strict scrutiny was misplaced. He contended that the Court's previous 'holding' in T.M. v. State (2001) that strict scrutiny applied was merely a recognition of the State's concession in that case, not a reasoned analysis, and therefore should not be controlling precedent. He believed the issue of the appropriate standard for reviewing juvenile curfew ordinances should be thoroughly re-evaluated given the lack of analytical basis in the prior decision.
Dissenting - Justice Cantero
Yes, the ordinances are constitutional. Justice Cantero argued that the ordinances do not implicate minors’ constitutional rights to privacy or any purported right to 'freedom of movement.' He contended that minors do not have a fundamental right to be in public unsupervised at any hour, given their unique vulnerabilities and the state's greater authority to regulate their conduct. Therefore, he believed that either the rational basis standard or, at most, intermediate scrutiny should apply, under which the ordinances would be constitutional. He challenged the majority's reliance on stare decisis for the strict scrutiny standard, arguing it was based on a prior concession and lacked analysis, and thus should be reconsidered under the 'law of the case' exception. Even if strict scrutiny were to apply, Justice Cantero asserted that the ordinances are narrowly tailored. He highlighted the limited hours of the curfew and the extensive list of exceptions (e.g., for First Amendment activities, employment, religious and civic functions, parental accompaniment, emergency errands), which he argued provide ample flexibility and preserve parental control. He also defended the inclusion of 17-year-olds as a valid legislative judgment and city-wide application as necessary for effective enforcement. Furthermore, he argued that the imposition of criminal penalties is a legislative prerogative concerning punishment and is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis of the underlying restriction; even if problematic, he contended they could be severed from the rest of the ordinance, which would then remain constitutional.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the constitutional limits on juvenile curfew ordinances in Florida, establishing a high bar for local governments. By affirming that minors possess fundamental rights to privacy and intrastate freedom of movement, triggering strict scrutiny, the Court reinforces that even well-intentioned public safety measures affecting juveniles must be precisely tailored. The decision emphasizes the need for carefully crafted exceptions to avoid prohibiting innocent conduct and a preference for civil rather than criminal penalties, thereby influencing future legislative efforts to balance public safety with individual liberties for minors. It also highlights the Florida Constitution's robust privacy protections, which can offer greater safeguards than the federal Constitution.
