State v. Ivy
350 N.W.2d 622, 119 Wis. 2d 591, 1984 Wisc. LEXIS 2598 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A person can be convicted of aiding and abetting an armed robbery without actual knowledge that the principals were armed, provided the armed robbery was a natural and probable consequence of the robbery they intended to aid. Whether a crime is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime is a question of fact for the jury.
Facts:
- On the evening of August 19, 1981, Roosevelt Hutchinson spoke with Gerald Collie Ivy, Jr., who was standing across the street from a gas station in Milwaukee.
- Hutchinson observed Ivy appearing nervous, looking from side to side, and saying to himself, 'Hurry up.'
- Shortly thereafter, Hutchinson heard two gunshots and then saw two men flee the gas station with a money sack; an employee inside had been shot and wounded.
- As the two men ran from the station, Ivy also ran in the same direction.
- When Hutchinson commented to Ivy that he assumed Ivy knew what was happening, Ivy replied, 'Shut up.'
- Ivy's defense was an alibi, claiming he was at his sister's house at the time of the robbery.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Wisconsin charged Gerald Collie Ivy, Jr. in trial court with armed robbery and injury by conduct regardless of life, both as a party to a crime.
- A jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.
- The trial court denied Ivy's postconviction motion for a new trial.
- Ivy, as appellant, appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury instructions were erroneous because a defendant must have actual knowledge that principals are armed to be guilty of aiding and abetting armed robbery.
- The State of Wisconsin, as petitioner, sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Does a person need to have actual knowledge that the principal perpetrators would be armed with a dangerous weapon to be convicted of aiding and abetting an armed robbery under the 'natural and probable consequence' doctrine?
Opinions:
Majority - Bablitch, J.
No. A person who aids and abets a robbery can be convicted of armed robbery if the use of a weapon was a natural and probable consequence of the intended robbery, even if the aider and abettor did not have actual knowledge the principals were armed. The court reasoned that under established precedent, an aider and abettor is responsible not only for the intended crime but also for other crimes that are a natural and probable consequence of the intended criminal acts. The court of appeals erred by establishing a per se rule that armed robbery can never be a natural and probable consequence of robbery. Since robbery is an inherently violent crime involving force, a jury could reasonably find in certain circumstances that the use of a weapon was a foreseeable escalation, making the determination a question of fact.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of accomplice liability under the 'natural and probable consequence' doctrine in Wisconsin. It rejects a bright-line rule requiring an accomplice's actual knowledge of a weapon for armed robbery liability, instead favoring a flexible, fact-specific inquiry to be resolved by the jury. This broadens the potential liability for accomplices, holding them responsible for foreseeable escalations in violence even if they were not aware of the specific means used. Future cases will turn on whether the particular circumstances of the planned crime made the use of a weapon a 'natural and probable' outcome.
