State v. Ireland (Slip Opinion)
2018 Ohio 4494, 155 Ohio St. 3d 287, 121 N.E.3d 285 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Under Ohio law, the defense of blackout is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Requiring a defendant to bear this burden does not violate their due process rights, even if the defense negates the state's requirement to prove the act was voluntary.
Facts:
- Darin K. Ireland, a military veteran, was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from his combat experience.
- As a result of his PTSD, Ireland experienced dissociative episodes.
- While outside a bar, Ireland's friend, Tyler Thrash, told Ireland that another man, Drew Coen, had inappropriately touched Ireland's wife.
- Following this statement, Ireland began to severely attack Coen.
- Ireland knocked Coen unconscious and then kicked and stomped on his head for several minutes, causing severe injuries including a broken jaw, nose, and orbital bone.
- A forensic psychologist testified that Ireland experienced a PTSD-induced dissociative episode during the assault, which compromised his consciousness and decision-making capabilities, causing him to act automatically.
Procedural Posture:
- Darin K. Ireland was indicted on one count of felonious assault in the Franklin County court of first instance.
- At a jury trial, the court instructed the jury that blackout is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
- Ireland, as appellant, appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding the trial court's jury instruction constituted structural error because it unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
- The State of Ohio, as appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which granted review.
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Issue:
Does treating the defense of blackout as an affirmative defense, which requires the defendant to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence, violate a defendant's due process rights by unconstitutionally shifting the state's burden of proving that the criminal act was voluntary?
Opinions:
Majority - Fischer, J.
No, treating blackout as an affirmative defense is constitutional and does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The blackout defense meets the statutory definition of an affirmative defense under R.C. 2901.05(D)(1)(b) because it is an 'excuse' for conduct that would otherwise be criminal, the knowledge of which is peculiar to the accused, and on which the accused can fairly be required to produce evidence. While the state must prove a 'voluntary act' under R.C. 2901.21(A), voluntariness is not an essential element of the offense itself; proof of the actus reus and mens rea necessarily includes evidence that the defendant acted voluntarily. Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent like Martin v. Ohio, the court reasoned that a state may require a defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, even if that defense overlaps with or tends to negate an element of the crime, so long as the state retains the ultimate burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's instructions correctly separated these burdens, and therefore did not violate Ireland's due process rights.
Concurring - DeGenaro, J.
No, the trial court did not err, but the majority's reasoning is flawed because it addresses a hypothetical question not truly at issue in this case. Ireland’s defense was not a true unconsciousness claim but was instead a diminished-capacity defense based on his PTSD, which is generally impermissible in Ohio outside of an insanity plea. Because insanity is a statutory affirmative defense, it was proper for the trial court to treat Ireland’s insanity-related diminished-capacity defense—which was mislabeled as 'blackout'—as an affirmative defense. The court should not have issued a broad ruling on the nature of all blackout defenses based on the unique and improper defense presented in this specific case, rendering the majority opinion merely advisory.
Dissenting - Kennedy, J.
Yes, treating blackout as an affirmative defense is unconstitutional because it improperly shifts the burden of proof for an element of the crime to the defendant. Under the plain language of R.C. 2901.21(A), a conscious, voluntary act is an element of every offense in Ohio, which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. A blackout defense is a 'failure-of-proof' defense that directly negates this element; it is not an 'excuse' or 'justification' that applies even if all elements are proven. Due process prohibits forcing a defendant to disprove an element of the crime. The trial court's instructions were inherently contradictory and confusing by telling the jury that the state had to prove consciousness beyond a reasonable doubt while also telling them the defendant had to prove unconsciousness by a preponderance of the evidence.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the treatment of unconsciousness-based defenses in Ohio, classifying them as affirmative defenses rather than failures of proof. By placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant, the court aligns Ohio with a minority of jurisdictions on this issue. The ruling creates a complex burden-shifting framework that, as the dissent notes, may be difficult for juries to apply, as evidence for the defense directly contradicts an element the state must prove. This case reinforces the legislature's and court's power to define criminal procedure and allocate burdens of proof, even when a defense and an element of the crime are two sides of the same coin.
