State v. Hutchinson
1980 Utah LEXIS 1108, 624 P.2d 1116 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory grant of general welfare power to a local government is an independent source of authority, empowering it to enact ordinances reasonably and appropriately related to public health, safety, morals, and welfare, thereby abandoning the rule of strict construction (Dillon's Rule). Such ordinances are valid unless they conflict with superior law, are arbitrary, or are preempted by state legislation.
Facts:
- Salt Lake County passed § 1-10-4, an ordinance requiring candidates for county office to file statements disclosing all monetary contributions to their campaigns.
- Hutchinson was a candidate for the office of Salt Lake County Commissioner.
- During his campaign, Hutchinson allegedly received a $6,000 contribution.
- Hutchinson was accused of failing to report the name and address of the person who gave him the $6,000 contribution.
- Hutchinson was also accused of failing to file supplemental campaign disclosures regarding the discharge of campaign debts.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Hutchinson in a city court with two misdemeanor counts of violating a Salt Lake County campaign finance disclosure ordinance.
- Hutchinson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the county ordinance was unconstitutional.
- The city court, a court of first instance, granted the motion, holding the county lacked authority to enact the ordinance, and dismissed the complaint.
- The State, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to a district court.
- The district court affirmed the city court's dismissal, finding no express or implied state statutory authority for the ordinance.
- The State, as appellant, then appealed the district court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court, the state's highest court, with Hutchinson as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a county ordinance requiring candidates for local office to disclose campaign contributions, enacted solely under the authority of a general statutory welfare clause, constitute a valid exercise of the county's legislative power?
Opinions:
Majority - Stewart, J.
Yes. A county ordinance requiring campaign finance disclosure is a valid exercise of the power granted by the general welfare clause. This court explicitly abandons Dillon's Rule, which required strict construction of powers delegated to local governments, as it is archaic and cripples effective local governance. The general welfare clause is not merely an extension of specifically enumerated powers but is an independent grant of broad authority, allowing counties to address local issues. The ordinance serves the legitimate public purpose of preserving the integrity of the electoral process by promoting transparency. Furthermore, the state has not preempted this area of regulation; state law requires disclosures only for certain statewide offices, indicating no legislative intent to occupy the entire field of campaign finance.
Dissenting - Maughan, J.
No. The county ordinance is not a valid exercise of legislative power. The police power is an attribute of state sovereignty, and local governments only possess powers specifically delegated by the legislature, which must be strictly construed. The general welfare clause does not provide a carte blanche delegation of police power; it only supplements specific grants of authority. The campaign finance ordinance does not have a substantial and reasonable relationship to the enumerated purposes of the general welfare clause, such as public safety, health, or morals. Moreover, the state has preempted the field of corrupt election practices through comprehensive legislation, and its choice to limit disclosure requirements to certain state offices represents a policy decision that should not be contradicted by local ordinances.
Dissenting - Wilkins, J.
No. I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan that Salt Lake County lacks the authority to enact the ordinances in question.
Analysis:
This decision represents a fundamental shift in Utah's jurisprudence on municipal law by formally rejecting the long-standing Dillon's Rule of strict construction for local government powers. By interpreting the general welfare clause as an independent and broad grant of authority, the court significantly expanded the autonomy of counties and cities. This precedent empowers local governments to be more responsive to their unique local needs without waiting for specific enabling legislation from the state legislature. The ruling rebalances the power between state and local governments, favoring local self-governance and potentially leading to a greater diversity of local ordinances across the state.
