State v. Huntington
575 N.W.2d 268, 1998 Wisc. LEXIS 38, 216 Wis. 2d 671 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
In child sexual assault cases, a victim’s out-of-court statements made after a delay may be admissible under the excited utterance or residual hearsay exceptions if the child exhibits sufficient stress and the statements have other indicia of reliability. The medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule extends to statements made by a parent on behalf of a child but does not apply to statements made to social workers or counselors.
Facts:
- Eugene Huntington was the stepfather to 11-year-old Jeri E. and had a close, father-daughter relationship with her since she was three years old.
- On numerous occasions when Jeri E. stayed overnight at his home, Huntington would enter her room and sexually abuse her by rubbing her private parts, inserting his finger into her vagina, and making her rub his penis.
- The last alleged incident of abuse occurred approximately two weeks before Jeri E. first disclosed the abuse to her mother.
- On the evening of August 19, 1994, upon learning she would have to spend two weeks alone with Huntington, Jeri E. placed a hysterical phone call to her mother from a friend's house, stating that Huntington had sexually abused her.
- When her mother and sister arrived, Jeri E. was sobbing, scared, and guilt-ridden, and proceeded to describe the details of the abuse to them.
- Within two hours of the initial disclosure, Jeri E. repeated her allegations to Officer Glau at the police department, remaining upset and crying throughout the interview.
- Nearly three months later, Jeri E. was examined by Nurse Diane McCormick for purposes of medical diagnosis and to develop a treatment plan.
Procedural Posture:
- Eugene Huntington was charged in the Circuit Court for Washburn County, the trial court, with six counts of felonious sexual assault of a child.
- Huntington filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude testimony from the victim's mother, sister, and Officer Glau as inadmissible hearsay.
- The circuit court denied the motion.
- At trial, the defense objected to Nurse McCormick's testimony as double hearsay and to Dr. Levitt's expert testimony as an improper assessment of credibility; the circuit court overruled both objections.
- A jury found Huntington guilty on three of the six counts.
- Huntington, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
- The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted Huntington's petition for review.
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Issue:
Do a child sexual assault victim's hearsay statements, made two weeks after the last alleged incident, fall within the excited utterance or residual hearsay exceptions, and does expert testimony explaining that the victim's behavior is consistent with other abuse victims constitute an impermissible opinion on the victim's credibility?
Opinions:
Majority - Bradley, J.
No. The trial court did not err in admitting the evidence, as the child's statements were admissible under recognized hearsay exceptions and the expert testimony did not impermissibly bolster the victim's credibility. The court rejected a bright-line application of the factors from State v. Gerald L.C., holding that even with a two-week delay, the child's hysterical state when making the statements to her mother, sister, and Officer Glau was sufficient to qualify them as excited utterances. The court also found the statements admissible under the residual hearsay exception, applying the five-factor test from State v. Sorenson and finding sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, including the child's lack of motive to fabricate. Regarding the double hearsay from Nurse McCormick, the court established that the medical diagnosis exception applies to a parent's statements on behalf of a child, making the mother's recounting of Jeri's statements admissible. However, the court declined to extend this exception to statements made to a social worker (Bell), ruling that portion of the testimony was admitted in error, but that the error was harmless. Finally, the court concluded that Dr. Levitt's expert testimony was permissible because she did not state that the victim was truthful, but rather explained that the victim's behaviors—such as delayed reporting and inability to recall the exact number of incidents—were consistent with the behavior of other child sexual abuse victims.
Dissenting - Geske, J.
The dissent argues that the majority has stretched the excited utterance and residual hearsay exceptions so far that they no longer possess the inherent trustworthiness that justifies their existence. For the excited utterance exception, the dissent contends there is a fundamental difference between a statement made while still under the stress from the event and a statement made while upset during a later recounting of the event; the record here only supports the latter. The dissent also criticizes the Sorenson factors used for the residual hearsay exception, arguing they force the trial judge to make a complex credibility determination that should be reserved for the jury. By loosening these exceptions, the dissent warns that the court risks admitting unreliable evidence and creating Confrontation Clause problems.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of hearsay exceptions in Wisconsin child sexual assault cases by adopting a flexible, case-by-case approach rather than a rigid, factor-based test for excited utterances. It establishes new precedent by extending the medical diagnosis exception to a parent's statements on behalf of their child, which aids in the admission of crucial evidence. However, the court simultaneously limits the scope of this exception by explicitly excluding statements made to social workers and counselors. This ruling provides prosecutors with greater latitude for admitting testimony about a child's delayed disclosure while setting a clear boundary on which professionals fall under the medical diagnosis exception.
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