State v. Hunter
2021 Ohio 1714 (2021)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense only when the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser offense. The mens rea of "knowingly" can be established when an individual is aware that their conduct will probably cause a certain result, or when objective criteria indicate a high probability of a result, and they act with conscious purpose to avoid learning that fact.
Facts:
- In the early morning hours of June 26, 2019, two-year-old Chloe Williams was sleeping at 208 South Foster Street, an occupied home, while being babysat by Sydney Riddle.
- Roscoe Hunter and a juvenile, B.B., found a gas can and carried it to 212 South Foster Street, an abandoned house situated next door to 208 South Foster Street.
- Hunter poured gasoline from the can into a bowl and directly onto a couch inside the abandoned house, then created a gasoline trail leading to the front door.
- Hunter used a lighter to ignite the gasoline trail, causing the abandoned house to quickly become engulfed in flames.
- Due to the close proximity (estimated 14-16 feet) of the two houses and windy conditions, the fire rapidly spread from the abandoned structure at 212 South Foster Street to the occupied home at 208 South Foster Street.
- The occupants of 208 South Foster Street evacuated, but two-year-old Chloe Williams tragically died in the fire, and the home sustained extensive damage requiring its demolition.
- A neighbor, Cody Brownfield, later informed police that Hunter had previously stated he was going to burn down the 'bando' (abandoned house).
- While in jail awaiting trial, Hunter admitted during a phone call to his mother, "Murder — we burnt down a house and killed somebody."
Procedural Posture:
- On July 29, 2019, a Richland County Grand Jury indicted Roscoe Hunter on Count One: Felony Murder (R.C. 2903.02(B)), Count Two: Aggravated Arson (R.C. 2909.02(A)(1), creating substantial risk of harm), and Count Three: Aggravated Arson (R.C. 2909.02(A)(2), causing physical harm to an occupied structure).
- Hunter's defense counsel requested jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses of arson and involuntary manslaughter prior to and during the trial in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.
- The trial court denied the defense's requests, concluding that arson was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson due to different elements, and therefore, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on arson was also inappropriate.
- On July 27, 2020, the jury found Hunter guilty on all three counts as charged in the indictment.
- The trial court merged Count Two with Count One and sentenced Hunter to fifteen years to life for Felony Murder (Count One), and eight to twelve years for Aggravated Arson (Count Three), ordering the sentences to run consecutively.
- Hunter appealed his convictions and sentences to the Fifth Appellate District of Ohio, raising two assignments of error, including that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offenses.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of arson and involuntary manslaughter when the defendant argued he was unaware the fire would spread to an occupied structure?
Opinions:
Majority - Gwin, J.
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of arson and involuntary manslaughter. The court held that even if arson were considered a lesser-included or inferior degree offense of aggravated arson, the evidence presented at trial would not reasonably support both an acquittal on the aggravated arson charges and a conviction upon the lesser offense of arson. The court applied the 'knowingly' standard from R.C. 2901.22(B), which requires awareness that one's conduct will 'probably' cause a certain result. Based on the objective facts, Hunter's actions demonstrated he acted knowingly: he used highly volatile gasoline as an accelerant in a wooden structure, the abandoned house was only 14-16 feet from an occupied residence, and strong winds were blowing towards the occupied structure. These circumstances created a "high probability" that the fire would spread and cause harm. The court found that Hunter either failed to ascertain these facts or acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning them, concluding that "deliberate ignorance or indifference cannot be a viable defense." Since the evidence overwhelmingly supported the elements of aggravated arson, an instruction on arson was not warranted. Consequently, if the aggravated arson instruction was appropriate, the argument for an involuntary manslaughter instruction (which relied on an arson conviction) also lacked merit.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar for receiving lesser-included offense instructions, emphasizing that "some evidence" is not enough; the evidence must reasonably support an acquittal on the greater charge and a conviction on the lesser. It also clarifies the application of the "knowingly" mens rea in arson cases, establishing that a defendant's awareness of probable harm can be inferred from objective circumstances, even if they claim subjective unawareness. The ruling suggests that individuals engaging in inherently dangerous acts, especially with highly combustible materials in close proximity to occupied structures, will likely be found to have acted "knowingly" regarding the potential for widespread harm, limiting defenses based on deliberate ignorance.
