State v. Hunter
692 N.W.2d 256, 2005 WI App 5, 278 Wis. 2d 419 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A trial judge's on-record comments evaluating the strength of the State's case and advising a defendant to consider a disposition short of trial, without direct involvement in specific plea offers or terms, do not constitute 'judicial participation in plea negotiations' that would trigger a conclusive presumption of involuntariness under the State v. Williams bright-line rule.
Facts:
- Antoine Hunter was charged with one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.
- Hunter filed a motion to suppress evidence in the trial court.
- On October 25, 2000, the trial court denied Hunter's motion to suppress evidence.
- Following the denial, the trial court told Hunter that he was 'unlikely...to be acquitted' given the evidence and his statements, that he was 'likely to be convicted,' and that he would get 'credit' by admitting guilt but 'won't get the credit' if a jury found him guilty.
- The trial court also told Hunter he 'would best be well-behaved during trial' and prevented Hunter from speaking when he attempted to respond.
- On May 2, 2001, Hunter tendered a no contest plea to the charge.
- Hunter later averred in an affidavit that the court’s comments at the October 25, 2000, motion hearing caused him to plead no contest in May of 2001.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Antoine Hunter with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.
- Hunter filed a motion to suppress evidence in the state trial court (the court of first instance).
- The trial court denied Hunter's suppression motion.
- Hunter subsequently entered a no contest plea in the trial court.
- The trial court accepted Hunter's plea and sentenced him to sixty-six months of imprisonment.
- Hunter filed a postconviction motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea, contending improper judicial influence.
- The trial court denied Hunter's postconviction motion without a hearing.
- Hunter appealed the judgment of conviction and the denial of his postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Does a trial judge's on-record comments evaluating the strength of the State's case and advising a defendant to consider a disposition short of trial, made after denying a suppression motion but without discussing specific plea terms, constitute 'judicial participation in plea negotiations' under State v. Williams such that the defendant's subsequent no contest plea is conclusively presumed involuntary?
Opinions:
Majority - Deininger, PJ.
No, a trial judge's comments on the strength of the State's case and advice to consider a disposition short of trial do not automatically constitute 'judicial participation in plea negotiations' under State v. Williams. The court distinguished its prior holding in Williams, which established a 'bright-line' rule conclusively presuming involuntariness only when there is 'direct judicial participation in the plea bargaining process itself,' such as convening settlement conferences or discussing specific sentence ranges. In Hunter's case, the trial court did not make or solicit specific offers, nor did it suggest or advocate for a particular plea agreement. The majority concluded that extending the Williams rule to encompass all comments regarding the strength of a case or advisability of a plea would undermine the rule's clarity and impede a trial court's case-management responsibilities. The court acknowledged the inappropriateness of the trial court's comments but found that the six months elapsed between the comments and the plea, coupled with intervening events like a change in counsel, a competency evaluation, and several court appearances where Hunter's right to trial was affirmed, demonstrated that Hunter's plea was, in fact, voluntarily entered. The court was particularly persuaded by the thorough plea colloquy and the court's restatement of the voluntariness question after sensing Hunter's hesitation. Thus, no constitutional violation occurred entitling Hunter to withdraw his plea as a matter of right.
Dissenting - Dykman, J.
Yes, the majority has effectively undermined the 'bright-line rule' established in State v. Williams regarding judicial involvement in plea bargaining. The dissent argues that Williams intended to bar 'any form of judicial participation in plea negotiations' to eliminate the need for after-the-fact inquiries into actual coercion. The reasons for this rule, as stated in State v. Wolfe, include preventing the impression of unfairness, preserving judicial objectivity, and avoiding coercion. The trial court's comments in this case clearly affected Hunter, as evidenced by his attorney's request for recusal and Hunter's own statement, 'I know everybody wants me to just take a plea.' The dissent views the passage of time not as negating coercion, but as Hunter finally succumbing to the pressure from the judge's earlier statements about more severe punishment if he insisted on a trial. The dissent emphasizes that the system should strive for the appearance of a fair trial, which is compromised when a judge predicts a guilty verdict before the case is heard. The dissent concludes that the majority's decision replaces a clear rule with a 'gray-area rule' that encourages coercion and more appeals, and that the original bright-line rule should have been maintained.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and arguably narrows the application of the 'bright-line rule' against judicial participation in plea negotiations established in State v. Williams. While Williams suggested 'any form' of participation was prohibited, Hunter distinguishes between direct involvement in negotiating plea terms (which triggers the conclusive presumption of involuntariness) and comments on the strength of the State's case or the advisability of a plea (which, while cautioned against, do not automatically invalidate a plea). This distinction introduces a nuanced standard, requiring courts to assess actual coercion if direct negotiation is absent, potentially leading to more factual inquiries rather than automatic withdrawal. The decision balances the need to preserve judicial impartiality with practical case management responsibilities, though the dissent argues it creates an undesirable 'gray area' that undermines the original rule's purpose.
