State v. Huff
769 N.W.2d 154, 2009 WI App 92, 319 Wis. 2d 258 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Wisconsin's unilateral conspiracy statute, legal impossibility is not a defense to a conspiracy charge. The crime is complete when a defendant, with the intent that a crime be committed, agrees with another to commit that crime, regardless of whether the object of the conspiracy is factually or legally attainable.
Facts:
- A flyer for incumbent Mike McGee, Jr.'s re-election campaign in Milwaukee's Sixth Aldermanic District promised 'Free! Food/Drinks' to anyone who showed a 'vote sticker' at an 'election party.'
- Concerned about potential election law violations, an election official contacted the City Attorney, which prompted an undercover police investigation.
- On March 15, 2007, Garrett L. Huff offered to drive undercover officer Wardell Dodds to City Hall to vote for McGee.
- After Dodds returned with an 'I voted' sticker, Huff paid him five dollars.
- Huff then told Dodds to find other people who wanted to get paid for voting.
- On March 27, 2007, Huff drove another undercover agent, Willie Brantley, to City Hall to vote, promising to pay him five dollars upon their return.
- After Brantley produced an 'I voted' sticker, Huff gave him five dollars.
- Huff also paid a third undercover officer, Dwayne Barnes, five dollars for bringing Brantley to the location to vote.
- None of the undercover officers involved in the investigation were residents of the Sixth Aldermanic District and were therefore legally ineligible to vote in that recall election.
Procedural Posture:
- Garrett L. Huff was charged in a Wisconsin trial court with three counts of conspiracy to commit election bribery.
- Following a trial, a jury found Huff guilty on all three counts.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against Huff.
- Huff, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is legal impossibility a valid defense to a charge of conspiracy to commit election bribery when the defendant's co-conspirators were undercover law enforcement officers who were legally ineligible to vote in the relevant election?
Opinions:
Majority - Fine, J.
No. Legal impossibility is not a defense to a conspiracy charge in Wisconsin. Wisconsin's conspiracy statute embraces a unilateral formulation, meaning the crime is committed when a person agrees with another to commit a crime with the requisite criminal intent, even if the other person is an undercover agent who only feigns agreement or if the crime's completion is impossible. The court's reasoning is that the statute focuses on the subjective behavior and criminal intent of the individual defendant. The harm of conspiracy is the agreement itself, which is a 'distinct evil, dangerous to the public.' The court aligns its reasoning with federal circuits, which have consistently held that impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy because the crime is the illegal agreement, making it irrelevant that the conspiracy's ends were 'objectively unattainable.' The court distinguished the 19th-century case of State v. Crowley, explaining that it was not about impossibility but about the public policy of not protecting 'rogues in their dealings with each other.'
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Wisconsin's adoption of the unilateral theory of conspiracy, explicitly extending it to situations of legal impossibility. By rejecting impossibility as a defense, the court aligns Wisconsin law with the modern trend in federal and state jurisdictions. This ruling strengthens the ability of law enforcement to use sting operations to prosecute inchoate crimes, as the defendant's culpability is judged on their subjective intent and agreement, not on the objective possibility of completing the substantive offense. The case establishes a clear precedent that the focus in a conspiracy prosecution is on the defendant's dangerous intent to break the law, not the feasibility of their plan.
