State v. Howard
597 P.2d 878, 1979 Utah LEXIS 909 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide when the evidence shows the defendant intentionally aimed and fired a deadly weapon at an intended victim, even if an unintended victim is killed as a result.
Facts:
- Animosity developed between two former friends, Marilyn Rust and Tammy Johnson, which came to involve their respective friends, including the defendant, who was a friend of Rust.
- After Rust found threatening notes on her car, the defendant brought a loaded 30-06 rifle and a .22 pistol to her apartment.
- The defendant slashed the tires on Tammy Johnson's car, and later, the tires on cars belonging to Tammy and her husband, Danny Johnson.
- Expecting trouble, the defendant brought a loaded 12-gauge shotgun to Rust's apartment on January 14, 1978.
- That night, the Johnsons and two friends came to Rust's apartment, where a one-hour argument ensued while the defendant stood by holding the loaded shotgun.
- As the Johnson group was leaving, an obscene remark from defendant to Tammy prompted her husband, Danny, to run back to the apartment door.
- Danny Johnson challenged the defendant to a fight, counted to five, and then lunged through the doorway toward the defendant.
- The defendant aimed the shotgun at Danny and fired. Just as he fired, another man, Stan Crager, jumped in front of Danny and was hit in the back. The defendant then pumped the shotgun and fired again, hitting Danny in the back. Both men died from their wounds.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder in an amended information filed in the district court.
- At trial, the defendant pleaded not guilty, contending he acted in self-defense.
- The defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide.
- The trial court instructed the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter but refused to give the requested instruction on negligent homicide.
- A jury convicted the defendant of one count of second degree murder and one count of manslaughter.
- The defendant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Utah, arguing the trial court erred by refusing the instruction.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide when the defendant admits to intentionally aiming and firing a shotgun at a person, thereby killing both the intended victim's intervening friend and the intended victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Maughan, Justice
No, the district court did not err by refusing the requested instruction on negligent homicide. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense only if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence upon which a conviction for that offense could rest. Here, the defendant’s own testimony established that he intentionally aimed the shotgun at Danny Johnson and fired. This act cannot be characterized as criminally negligent, which requires that the actor 'ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk' but fails to perceive it. By aiming and firing a shotgun at a person, the defendant's conduct demonstrated, at a minimum, a conscious disregard of a substantial risk (recklessness), if not an intentional or knowing act. Under Utah's transferred intent statute (§ 76-5-204), the defendant's mental state regarding the intended victim, Danny Johnson, is transferred to the unintended victim, Stan Crager. Therefore, because no evidence supported a finding that the defendant was merely negligent as to his intended target, no instruction on negligent homicide was warranted for either death.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the evidentiary threshold required for a defendant to receive a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. It establishes that a defendant's own admission of intentional conduct, such as aiming a deadly weapon, can preclude an instruction on a negligence-based offense as a matter of law. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the application of the transferred intent doctrine in Utah, confirming that the defendant's mental state follows the 'unlucky' transfer of the harmful result to an unintended victim. This prevents defendants from arguing for a lesser degree of culpability simply because their intended harmful act had an unintended target.
