State v. Hopkins
147 Wash. 198, 265 P. 481, 59 A.L.R. 688 (1928)
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Rule of Law:
An owner of an automobile who is present in the vehicle may be held criminally liable for manslaughter as a principal if they knowingly entrust the operation of the car to an intoxicated driver whose reckless driving subsequently causes a death.
Facts:
- Christine Hopkins, the owner of a Studebaker automobile, had consumed two or three drinks of whiskey one evening.
- She and her friend, known as "Jimmie Burns," agreed to take her car for a ride, with Burns driving.
- Burns drove the car in an erratic and reckless manner, proceeding for several blocks on the wrong side of the highway.
- While on the wrong side of the road, the Hopkins vehicle collided with a car driven by the Ames family.
- The collision caused Lois Ames to be thrown from her family's car, resulting in fatal injuries.
- Immediately after the accident, Burns disappeared from the scene.
- A witness observed a man, who appeared to be intoxicated, leaning against the Hopkins car shortly after the crash.
- At the scene, Hopkins stated to another person, "I told him that he could not drive."
Procedural Posture:
- Christine Hopkins was charged by information with the crime of manslaughter in the superior court for King county.
- A trial was held before a jury in the superior court.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
- The superior court entered a judgment of conviction against Hopkins.
- Hopkins, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Washington Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does an automobile owner who, knowing the driver is intoxicated, entrusts the vehicle to that driver and remains a passenger, commit manslaughter by aiding and abetting if the driver's reckless operation causes a death?
Opinions:
Majority - Parker, J.
Yes. An automobile owner who entrusts their vehicle to a known intoxicated driver can be held liable as a principal for manslaughter if that driver's reckless operation causes a death. Under Washington statute, the distinction between a principal and an accessory before the fact is abolished, meaning anyone who aids or abets in a crime is treated as a principal. Manslaughter does not require an intent to kill, but it does involve the intent to commit an unlawful or grossly negligent act. Here, Hopkins was charged with criminal negligence for placing her car in the charge of John Doe (Burns), knowing he was intoxicated, and permitting him to drive in a reckless manner that resulted in Lois Ames's death. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Burns was intoxicated, that his condition was or should have been known to Hopkins, and that her act of entrusting the car to him constituted aiding and abetting the crime.
Dissenting - French, J.
No. One cannot aid and abet in the commission of manslaughter because it is an unintentional and involuntary crime. The dissent argues that prior precedent establishes that the legal character of manslaughter excludes the possibility of an accessory before the fact. Because aiding and abetting requires an overt act to contribute to a criminal act, one cannot logically aid or abet an unintentional act. Furthermore, the dissent contends there was insufficient evidence to prove that the intoxicated man seen after the crash was the driver, and there was no evidence of any overt act by Hopkins to encourage the reckless driving, especially given that she herself was intoxicated.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the scope of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes like vehicular manslaughter. It establishes that the requisite 'act' for aiding and abetting can be a negligent omission or the act of entrusting a dangerous instrumentality to an incompetent person. This precedent holds passive vehicle owners criminally responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their decision to allow an intoxicated person to drive, shifting focus from active participation to the negligent creation of a dangerous situation. Future cases involving passengers or owners in similar circumstances will look to this ruling to determine criminal culpability.
