State v. Holmes
1987 La. App. LEXIS 8459, 502 So. 2d 1112 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
The 'anything of value' element in Louisiana's first-degree murder statute, La.R.S. 14:30(A)(4), is limited to murder-for-hire or murder-for-contract situations and does not encompass the intangible benefit a person receives from killing a witness to silence their testimony.
Facts:
- In June 1985, Warren Holmes shot Jiles Pierce four times during an argument.
- Holmes was subsequently charged with aggravated battery for the shooting.
- After being released on bond, Holmes engaged in a campaign of threats and harassment to intimidate Pierce into dropping the charges.
- Pierce reported these threats to the district attorney's office.
- On January 22, 1986, Holmes ambushed Pierce near his car and shot him five times, killing him.
- An eyewitness heard Holmes say, 'It’s over now,' as he left the scene of the murder.
Procedural Posture:
- Warren Holmes was indicted by a grand jury for the first-degree murder of Jiles Pierce under La.R.S. 14:30(A)(4).
- In the trial court, Holmes filed a motion to quash the indictment.
- Holmes argued that the murder of a witness to procure their silence did not satisfy the statute's requirement that the offender 'received anything of value'.
- The trial court granted Holmes's motion to quash the first-degree murder indictment.
- The State, as appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the present court.
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Issue:
Does the act of killing a witness to prevent their testimony in a pending criminal case constitute receiving 'anything of value' sufficient to support a first-degree murder charge under La.R.S. 14:30(A)(4)?
Opinions:
Majority - Lobrano, Judge
No. The intangible benefit of silencing a witness does not constitute receiving 'anything of value' under La.R.S. 14:30(A)(4). The court reasoned that interpreting 'anything of value' to include any beneficial result accruing to the murderer would lead to absurd consequences, as every murder involves some motive or benefit from the killer's perspective (e.g., revenge, silence). Such a broad interpretation would effectively make every intentional killing first-degree murder, rendering the statutory scheme of different degrees of homicide meaningless. The court found further support for a narrow interpretation by looking at the Code of Criminal Procedure's list of aggravating circumstances, which lists receiving 'anything of value' and the victim being a 'witness in a prosecution against the defendant' as two separate and distinct factors. If the legislature had intended 'anything of value' to include silencing a witness, it would not have needed to list the 'victim was a witness' factor separately, as it would be redundant. Therefore, the court concluded that 'anything of value' in this context is meant to cover only the familiar murder-for-hire or murder-for-contract situation.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the 'anything of value' provision within Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. By rejecting the State's broad interpretation, the court clarifies that this specific aggravating factor is aimed exclusively at contract killings. This forces prosecutors to rely on other statutory provisions, such as those specifically addressing the murder of a witness, rather than this more general 'value' provision. The ruling emphasizes the importance of statutory construction to avoid absurd results and ensure that distinct parts of a legislative scheme are not rendered redundant.
