State v. Henderson
53 State Rptr. 958, 925 P.2d 475, 278 Mont. 376 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if it is: (1) similar to the charged offense; (2) not remote in time; (3) offered for a permissible purpose such as proving identity or common scheme, and not simply to prove character; and (4) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Facts:
- In 1984, Bill J. Henderson lived in Missoula with S.B. and her three children, A.B., D.B., and B.B.
- On several occasions, Henderson engaged in sexual intercourse with A.B.
- During the same time period, Henderson also forced A.B.'s two young brothers, D.B. and B.B., to perform simulated sexual acts with her.
- In December 1984, the children moved to Anchorage, Alaska, to live with their maternal grandparents.
- Upon their arrival, A.B. told her grandmother, Do.B., that Henderson had sexually abused her.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1988, Bill J. Henderson was charged with sexual intercourse without consent and accountability for incest in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County.
- Following a jury trial, Henderson was convicted of both charges but fled before being sentenced.
- After being apprehended and sentenced in 1993, Henderson appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court of Montana.
- In a 1994 decision, the Supreme Court reversed both convictions, ordering an acquittal on the incest charge and remanding the sexual intercourse without consent charge for a new trial.
- Prior to the retrial, the State filed a 'Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Other Acts,' seeking to admit testimony about Henderson making the children perform simulated sexual acts with each other.
- The District Court granted the State's motion, ruling the evidence admissible under the modified Just rule.
- At the conclusion of the retrial, a jury found Henderson guilty of sexual intercourse without consent.
- Henderson then appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Supreme Court of Montana, challenging the evidentiary ruling.
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Issue:
Does the admission of evidence of 'other acts,' specifically that the defendant forced the victim's brothers to perform simulated sexual acts with the victim, satisfy the four-part modified Just test for admissibility when the defendant is charged with sexual intercourse without consent with the victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Terry N. Trieweiler
No. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of 'other acts' because the evidence satisfied all four requirements of the modified Just rule. First, the 'other acts' were sufficiently similar to the charged offense as they involved the same victim, were part of the same series of occurrences, and were all acts of Henderson's sexual manipulation of the children for his gratification. Second, the acts were not remote in time, a point Henderson conceded. Third, the evidence was admitted for proper purposes—identity and common scheme—which were at issue because Henderson denied the allegations and suggested another man was the perpetrator. Fourth, while the evidence was prejudicial, its strong probative value in confirming the perpetrator's identity was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the application of Montana's modified Just rule for admitting 'other acts' evidence, especially in sexual abuse cases. It clarifies that the 'similarity' requirement is flexible and context-dependent, focusing on whether the other act is relevant to a disputed issue rather than being identical to the charged crime. The case underscores that when a defendant makes identity a central issue by denying involvement and blaming another, the prosecution has greater leeway to introduce evidence of other acts to corroborate the victim's identification. This provides lower courts with a clear example of how to balance the powerful probative value of such evidence against its inherent prejudicial effect.
