State v. Heather L. Steinhardt
896 N.W.2d 700, 2017 WI 62, 375 Wis. 2d 712 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant may receive multiple punishments for offenses arising from the same criminal episode if the offenses, though identical in law, are not identical in fact. Offenses are not identical in fact if they are supported by separate volitional acts that are significantly different in nature, such as an act of commission versus an act of omission.
Facts:
- For approximately three years, Heather L. Steinhardt's husband, Walter, repeatedly expressed to Steinhardt an interest in having sex with her twelve-year-old daughter, F.G.
- On April 1, 2013, Steinhardt acquiesced to Walter's requests.
- Steinhardt went to another room where F.G. was, brought her into the bedroom Steinhardt shared with Walter, and sat with her on the bed where Walter was waiting.
- Walter then told F.G. to remove her clothes.
- Walter proceeded to engage in three distinct sexual acts with F.G.: digital penetration, oral sex, and sexual intercourse.
- Throughout the entire assault, Steinhardt remained seated on the bed.
- After the assault concluded, Steinhardt followed F.G. into the bathroom as F.G. went to take a shower.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Heather L. Steinhardt in Ozaukee County circuit court (trial court) with failure to protect a child, first-degree sexual assault as a party to a crime, and child enticement.
- Steinhardt pled no contest to all three counts and was sentenced by the circuit court.
- Steinhardt filed a postconviction motion asking the circuit court to vacate the failure-to-protect conviction on double jeopardy grounds and requested a hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
- The circuit court denied Steinhardt's motion.
- Steinhardt, as appellant, appealed the circuit court's decision to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief.
- Steinhardt, as petitioner, sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (highest court).
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Issue:
Do convictions for both failure to protect a child from sexual assault and first-degree sexual assault of a child as a party to a crime violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions when both charges arise from a single criminal episode?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Michael J. Gableman
No. The convictions do not violate double jeopardy because the offenses of failure to protect a child and first-degree sexual assault as a party to a crime are not identical in fact. The court reasoned that the two convictions were supported by two distinct acts that were significantly different in nature. Steinhardt’s act of bringing her daughter, F.G., to the bedroom was an act of commission that supported the sexual assault charge (as party to a crime). In contrast, her act of sitting on the bed and observing the assault was an act of omission that supported the failure to protect charge. The court found this was a 'significant change in activity' and represented two separate volitional acts, similar to precedents like State v. Eisch where different types of sexual acts during one assault were treated as separate crimes. Furthermore, the court held that Steinhardt failed to overcome the presumption that the legislature intended cumulative punishments, as the statutory language, legislative history, and nature of the conduct all support punishing these separate harms.
Dissenting - Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson
Yes. The convictions violate double jeopardy because the offenses are identical in both law and fact, and the legislature did not intend for multiple punishments arising from a single, continuous course of conduct. The dissent argued that the majority improperly 'slices and dices' Steinhardt's single criminal act into a contrived distinction between commission and omission. The same set of facts alleged in the complaint—bringing the child to the room and remaining there—supports both charges. The dissent contended that this was a single, continuous transaction with an unvarying criminal intent, making it fundamentally unfair to impose multiple punishments. The dissent warned that the majority's reasoning opens the door to prosecutorial overcharging by allowing a single criminal episode to be broken down into numerous offenses based on malleable distinctions.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'identical in fact' prong of Wisconsin's double jeopardy test by endorsing a distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission within a single criminal episode. The case establishes a precedent that allows prosecutors to secure multiple convictions for what might otherwise be viewed as a single, continuous course of conduct, thereby potentially increasing penalties for defendants. It narrows the scope of double jeopardy protection in situations where a defendant's conduct can be parsed into distinct active and passive phases. This ruling will likely influence charging decisions in cases involving accomplices or facilitators who play multiple roles in the commission of a crime.
