State v. Head

Wisconsin Supreme Court
255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413, 2002 WI 99 (2002)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

To mitigate first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide under a theory of unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-defense), a defendant must show an actual, subjective belief that they were in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force used was necessary, even if those beliefs were objectively unreasonable.

Facts:

Debra Head and Harold Head were married for 22 years and had two daughters.
In January 1998, after learning their teenage daughter was pregnant, Harold became enraged, grabbed two guns, and threatened to kill the father, Chad Graves.
Over the next several months, Harold continued to make violent threats against Graves, causing Debra to be fearful of his temper.
Debra sought to introduce evidence of Harold's long history of violence, including threats to kill her if she filed for divorce, physically throwing her and injuring her back, and numerous violent outbursts towards others.
On the morning of May 29, 1998, during an argument about the pregnancy, Harold yelled at Debra and stated, 'Maybe I should just take care of you guys and get on with my life.'
Debra interpreted this as a threat to kill her and Graves.
Debra testified that Harold then clenched his fists, threw back the bed covers, and moved as if reaching for a handgun he kept under the bed.
Believing Harold was about to attack her, Debra grabbed the gun first and shot him twice, causing his death.

Procedural Posture:

Debra Head was charged with first-degree intentional homicide in Rock County Circuit Court, the trial court of first instance.
Prior to trial, Head filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence of the victim's past violent acts to support a self-defense claim.
The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that Head had not presented a sufficient objective factual basis to raise the issue of self-defense.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court refused Head's request for jury instructions on perfect and imperfect self-defense.
The jury convicted Head of first-degree intentional homicide.
Head, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, the state's highest court, granted Head's petition for review.

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Issue:

Does a defendant claiming imperfect self-defense to first-degree intentional homicide need to make an initial showing that their belief of an unlawful interference was objectively reasonable in order to introduce evidence of the victim's prior violent acts and receive a jury instruction on the defense?

Opinions:

Majority - David T. Prosser, J.

No. To receive a jury instruction on unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-defense), a defendant is not required to satisfy an objective threshold showing that they reasonably believed they were in imminent danger; rather, they must only show some evidence that they actually believed they were in imminent danger and that the force used was necessary to defend themselves. The court reasoned that the plain language of the relevant statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b), explicitly provides for mitigation if 'either belief was unreasonable,' which contrasts sharply with the perfect self-defense statute's requirement of reasonable beliefs. The legislative history confirms this interpretation, as the legislature considered and rejected an amendment that would have added an objective reasonableness threshold. Therefore, the court modified its prior holding in State v. Camacho, which had imposed such an objective threshold based on a previous version of the statute. The court also held that evidence of the victim's past violent acts (McMorris evidence) is admissible to help establish the defendant's actual, subjective state of mind.

Concurring - Shirley S. Abrahamson, C.J.

I join the majority opinion but write separately to express my disagreement with the statement of the harmless error standard used by the majority, for reasons articulated in my dissents in prior cases.

Concurring - Jon E. Wilcox, J.

I agree with the majority's result but would decide the case on narrower grounds. The circuit court committed a clear error by refusing to consider the proffered McMorris evidence when making its preliminary determination on the admissibility of the self-defense claim. Under Wisconsin's rules of evidence, a judge making such a preliminary finding is not bound by the rules of evidence and should have considered Debra's offer of proof about her husband's past violence. This misapplication of the law was prejudicial and sufficient on its own to warrant a new trial, without needing to reach the broader statutory interpretation questions addressed by the majority.

Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies Wisconsin homicide law by drawing a sharp distinction between the requirements for perfect and imperfect self-defense. By removing the objective reasonableness threshold for imperfect self-defense and modifying the precedent set in State v. Camacho, the court makes it easier for defendants to introduce evidence of a victim's violent history. This is particularly impactful for defendants in domestic abuse situations, as it focuses the legal inquiry on the defendant's actual, subjective perception of danger, which may have been shaped by a long history of abuse, rather than on what a hypothetical reasonable person would have believed. The ruling lowers the evidentiary bar for defendants seeking to mitigate a first-degree homicide charge, ensuring that their unique state of mind can be fully considered by the jury.

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