State v. Hayes
105 Mo. 76 (1891)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant cannot be convicted of a crime by aiding and abetting another person if that other person, acting as a decoy or informant, lacks the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime. For criminal liability to be imputed, the parties must share a common criminal motive and design.
Facts:
- Defendant Hayes proposed to William Hill that they burglarize A. Payne & Son's general store.
- Hill informed the store owners and members of an anti-horse thief association of Hayes's plan, and they arranged to entrap him.
- On the night of June 1, 1886, one of the store owners and others hid in and around the store to capture Hayes.
- Hayes met Hill and they proceeded to the store together.
- At the store, Hayes lifted a window and assisted Hill in breaking the window catch and climbing through it into the store's warehouse.
- Hill, who was inside, passed a 45-pound side of bacon out of the window to Hayes.
- Hayes then assisted Hill back out of the window.
- As Hayes and Hill began to leave with the bacon, the hidden men apprehended Hayes.
Procedural Posture:
- Hayes was prosecuted for burglary and larceny in the circuit court of Sullivan county, a state trial court.
- A jury found Hayes guilty of the charges.
- The trial court sentenced Hayes to five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.
- Hayes, as the appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the reviewing appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit burglary when he assists another person in entering a building with the intent to steal, if that other person is merely a decoy who lacks a felonious intent and is acting to entrap the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Thomas, J.
No. A defendant does not commit burglary under these circumstances because an essential element of the crime—the criminal act of entry performed by a person with felonious intent—is missing. To be guilty of a crime by assisting another, the person being assisted must also be acting with a criminal intent. The court reasoned that burglary requires both a criminal act (actus reus) and a criminal intent (mens rea). Here, Hayes possessed the criminal intent but did not perform the act of entry. Hill performed the physical act of entry but lacked the criminal intent, as he was a decoy acting solely to entrap Hayes. Because Hill's act was not criminal, it cannot be imputed to Hayes to make him guilty of burglary. For the act of one person to be imputed to another as a criminal offense, there must be a 'community of motive,' which was absent here as Hayes's motive (theft) was antagonistic to Hill's motive (entrapment).
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial limitation on accomplice liability, particularly in cases involving government informants or decoys. It clarifies that a defendant's criminal intent is not enough to sustain a conviction; all elements of the crime's actus reus must be present and attributable to a party acting with mens rea. This prevents law enforcement or their agents from manufacturing an essential element of an offense to secure a conviction. The ruling distinguishes between providing an opportunity for a predisposed individual to commit a crime (which is permissible) and performing an essential element of the crime on their behalf (which negates the crime itself).
