State v. Harris
680 N.W.2d 737, 2004 WI 64, 272 Wis. 2d 80 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
While the U.S. Constitution does not require pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment evidence, Wisconsin's reciprocal discovery statute mandates such disclosure within a reasonable time before trial, encompassing the period prior to a plea bargain if the plea is entered close to the trial date. Failure to disclose such evidence, if it would have prevented the defendant from pleading guilty, constitutes a manifest injustice warranting plea withdrawal.
Facts:
- Kevin Harris, a 31-year-old man with an eighth-grade education and a history of serious mental illness, was accused of first-degree sexual assault of B.M.M., a six-year-old, on April 11, 2001.
- The criminal complaint alleged Harris touched B.M.M. on her vaginal area over her clothing, and Harris admitted to Detective Ray Otto that he kissed her head and patted her leg but denied inappropriate touching.
- On May 30, 2001, Harris filed a discovery demand with the court, requesting all exculpatory evidence, including evidence that could negate his guilt or affect witness credibility.
- On June 1, 2001, B.M.M. alleged to the Elkhorn Police Department that her grandfather had sexually assaulted her on two occasions between February 16-23, 2001, describing how he licked his fingers and touched her vaginal area and "butt-crack" underneath her pajamas.
- On July 25, 2001, approximately two weeks before his scheduled jury trial, Harris entered into a plea agreement with the State and pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a child as a repeater.
- The State did not disclose B.M.M.'s allegation against her grandfather to Harris before he entered his guilty plea.
- After Harris was sentenced, Assistant District Attorney Maureen Boyle informed Harris's trial counsel about B.M.M.'s prior allegation against her grandfather.
Procedural Posture:
- On April 24, 2001, the State filed a criminal complaint against Kevin Harris in Walworth County Circuit Court, alleging first-degree sexual assault of a child and bail jumping.
- On May 2, 2001, Harris waived his preliminary hearing and pleaded not guilty to both counts.
- A jury trial was set for August 6-8, 2001.
- On June 5, 2001, after substituting counsel, Harris changed his plea to not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI), and Judge James L. Carlson ordered a psychiatric evaluation.
- On July 25, 2001, with the psychiatric evaluation not supporting his NGI plea, Harris entered a plea agreement with the State, pleading guilty to count one (first-degree sexual assault of a child as a repeater).
- On September 21, 2001, Judge Carlson sentenced Harris to a 45-year term of imprisonment.
- On April 30, 2002, Harris filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was amended on May 6, 2002, before Judge Michael S. Gibbs.
- Harris's motion alleged that the State failed to disclose that B.M.M. had previously alleged sexual assault by her grandfather, violating his due process right to exculpatory evidence.
- On July 25, 2002, the Walworth County Circuit Court (Judge Gibbs) granted Harris's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding a due process violation and that Harris would not have pled guilty but for the violation.
- On September 30, 2002, the State filed a notice of appeal, appealing the circuit court's order to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the State violated Harris's constitutional and statutory discovery rights.
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Issue:
Does due process or Wisconsin's reciprocal discovery statute (§ 971.23(1)(h)) require the State to disclose material exculpatory impeachment evidence before a defendant enters into a plea bargain, thereby entitling the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if such evidence is not disclosed?
Opinions:
Majority - JON E WILCOX, J.
No, due process does not require the disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment information before a defendant enters into a plea bargain, but Yes, Wisconsin's discovery statute (§ 971.23(1)(h)) does require such disclosure within a reasonable time before trial, and the State's failure to do so, which induced Harris's guilty plea, necessitates plea withdrawal to avoid a manifest injustice. The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Ruiz, held that due process does not mandate the disclosure of material impeachment evidence prior to a plea agreement. The Court determined that the right to impeachment information is primarily relevant to the fairness of a criminal trial, not to the voluntariness of a plea, and that the Constitution does not require a defendant to be aware of all relevant circumstances before entering a plea. However, Wisconsin's discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h), imposes a broader obligation, requiring prosecutors to disclose "any exculpatory evidence" to the defendant "within a reasonable time before trial" upon demand. This statutory timing requirement is more stringent than the constitutional Brady standard. The undisclosed allegation regarding B.M.M.'s grandfather was "favorable to the accused" because it constituted impeachment evidence that could cast doubt on B.M.M.'s credibility and the State's expert witnesses (as a potential alternate source of sexual knowledge or a basis for projection). This evidence was "material" because its nondisclosure undermined confidence in the outcome of the judicial proceeding, as Harris offered proof he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known about it. The State's argument that the evidence would be inadmissible under Pulizzano was unpersuasive because Harris was denied the opportunity to investigate and bring a Pulizzano motion. "Within a reasonable time before trial" means disclosure within sufficient time for the evidence's effective use. Given Harris's plea was entered two weeks before his scheduled trial, and the evidence would have required further investigation and potentially complex motions and expert testimony, disclosure was required before the plea. Therefore, the State's statutory violation, which deprived Harris of a guaranteed right and induced his guilty plea, constitutes a "manifest injustice" under Hatcher v. State, requiring the withdrawal of his plea.
Concurring - JON E WILCOX, J.
Justice Wilcox concurred, reiterating his belief that the decision in United States v. Ruiz is not limited to impeachment evidence but extends to both material impeachment evidence and material exculpatory evidence. He noted that the plea agreement at issue in Ruiz included a waiver of rights related to affirmative defenses, which are inherently exculpatory. Furthermore, he emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly treated exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence the same for Brady purposes. Therefore, if due process does not require disclosure of impeachment evidence prior to a plea agreement, it logically follows that it does not require disclosure of exculpatory evidence either, as the purpose of Brady is to ensure a fair trial, a concern not implicated at the plea stage.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the distinct, yet overlapping, requirements of federal constitutional due process (via Brady and Ruiz) and state statutory discovery obligations in the context of criminal guilty pleas. It establishes that while the U.S. Constitution may not mandate pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence, state statutes can impose broader discovery duties that compel such disclosure. This ruling enhances transparency in the plea bargaining process, particularly when a plea is entered shortly before trial, by ensuring defendants have access to crucial Brady-type evidence before making a life-altering decision. Consequently, prosecutors in jurisdictions with similar discovery statutes will face increased pressure to disclose all favorable and material evidence, including impeachment information, at an earlier stage, which impacts plea strategies and strengthens the integrity of plea agreements by fostering more informed decision-making by defendants.
