The STATE of Texas, v. Steven Mack HARDY

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc
963 S.W.2d 516 (1997)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

In Texas, a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the results of a blood-alcohol test conducted by hospital personnel for medical purposes following a traffic accident. Therefore, the state's acquisition of such records via a grand jury subpoena does not constitute an unreasonable search.

Facts:

Appellee was involved in an automobile accident on December 3, 1992.
Trooper Authier of the Department of Public Safety investigated the scene and formed the opinion that appellee was intoxicated.
Due to his injuries, appellee was transported by helicopter to a local hospital for treatment.
During the course of treatment, the hospital drew appellee's blood and conducted a blood alcohol test for medical purposes.
The test results indicated that appellee’s blood alcohol content was .239.
On December 7, Trooper Authier obtained a grand jury subpoena for any alcohol or drug information related to appellee’s treatment.
The hospital provided the records in compliance with the subpoena.
Ten days later, appellee was formally charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.

Procedural Posture:

Appellee was charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated in the trial court.
Before trial, appellee filed a motion to suppress the medical records containing the blood-test results.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress.
The State, as appellant, appealed the trial court's order to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case.
The appellee petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court, for discretionary review, which was granted.

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Issue:

Does a defendant possess a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in medical records containing blood-alcohol test results, created by a hospital for medical purposes after a traffic accident, such that the State's acquisition of those records through a grand jury subpoena constitutes an unreasonable search?

Opinions:

Majority - Keller, J.

No. A defendant does not have a societally recognized reasonable expectation of privacy in blood-alcohol test results from tests taken by hospital personnel solely for medical purposes after a traffic accident. First, Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 509 explicitly states, 'There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal proceedings,' thereby abrogating any statutory privilege that previously existed. Second, while the drawing of blood by the government implicates the Fourth Amendment, here the government only acquired a written report from a third party. The defendant's privacy expectation was already frustrated by the actions of non-governmental medical personnel who drew and tested the blood for their own purposes. Given the universality of implied consent laws and society's strong interest in combating drunk driving, any expectation of privacy in these specific test results is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

Dissenting - Price, J.

Yes. A reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the test results of a person’s blood analysis contained within their medical records. Medical records are fundamentally different from bank records; they contain highly personal information and are not intended to enter the stream of commerce. Society recognizes this expectation of privacy through medical ethics and a general understanding of confidentiality. Therefore, the State's use of a grand jury subpoena to obtain these records constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. This search was unreasonable because it was conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, as the records were in no danger of being destroyed.

Dissenting - Baird, J.

This opinion dissents from the court's denial of a motion for rehearing. The dissent argues that the majority and dissenting opinions on original submission failed to consider the Legislature's re-enactment of the physician-patient privilege statute. This legislative action was relevant to determining whether society recognizes an expectation of privacy in medical records, and the court should have addressed it to provide a correct and full analysis of the issue.

Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and medical privacy in the context of Texas DWI investigations. By holding that the abrogation of the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases eliminates any reasonable expectation of privacy in post-accident blood-alcohol test results, the court provides prosecutors with a clear, warrant-free path to obtain critical evidence. The ruling narrows the scope of privacy protections for medical records, distinguishing the acquisition of existing records from a third-party hospital from the direct, government-compelled physical intrusion of a blood draw. This precedent lowers the procedural hurdles for the State in prosecuting DWI cases arising from traffic accidents where the suspect receives medical treatment.

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