State v. Gyles
313 So. 2d 799 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
Under a murder statute that defines the crime as the killing of a 'human being' and is derived from common law, the term 'human being' refers only to a person who has been born alive. Therefore, conduct that causes the death of a fetus not born alive does not constitute murder under such a statute.
Facts:
- Arthur Ray Gyles struck a woman with a stick and his fist.
- At the time of the beating, the woman was eight months pregnant.
- Shortly after the assault, the woman began hemorrhaging and was taken to a hospital.
- Approximately eight hours after the beating, the woman delivered a stillborn male child.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Arthur Ray Gyles with second degree murder in a district court (trial court).
- Gyles filed a motion to quash the indictment, arguing his alleged conduct did not constitute murder under Louisiana law.
- The trial court denied Gyles' motion to quash the indictment.
- Gyles sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted certiorari to rule on the issue.
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Issue:
Does causing the death of an eight-month-old unborn fetus, resulting in a stillbirth, constitute the crime of second degree murder under the Louisiana statute defining murder as 'the killing of a human being'?
Opinions:
Majority - Barham, J.
No. Causing the stillbirth of a fetus does not constitute murder under the Louisiana statute because the statute, rooted in common law, proscribes only the killing of a human being who has been born alive. The Louisiana murder statute, La.R.S. 14:30.1, codified the common law definition of murder, which historically required the victim to be a person 'in being,' meaning born alive. The uniform interpretation across American jurisdictions holds that without a specific feticide statute, homicide laws do not apply to the death of an unborn fetus. This Court cannot create a crime or extend a penal statute by analogy, as that power belongs exclusively to the legislature. While a fetus is recognized as a person for civil law purposes, it is not considered a 'human being' for the purpose of the criminal murder statute.
Concurring - Calogero, J.
No. While I personally believe an eight-and-a-half-month-old unborn fetus is a human being, the court is bound by the clear legislative intent of the 1942 statute, which adopted the common law 'born alive' rule. It is inappropriate for the judiciary to rewrite a statute under the guise of interpretation. The legislature, through an appropriate amendment, is the proper body to define and proscribe the killing of a viable fetus as murder.
Dissenting - Summers, J.
Yes. The act constitutes murder because the statute's plain language prohibits the 'killing of a human being,' and a viable eight-month-old fetus is a human being. The court should not disregard the clear and unambiguous letter of the law under the pretext of adhering to historical common law interpretations. The statute should be given a genuine construction according to the fair import of its words, and the purpose of the law is to prevent the killing of human beings, which is what occurred in this case.
Analysis:
This case is a classic example of judicial restraint and the strict construction of penal statutes. The court affirmed the 'born alive' rule, a long-standing common law doctrine, holding that courts cannot expand the definition of a crime to include conduct not clearly proscribed by the legislature. This decision highlights the distinction between legal personhood for civil purposes (e.g., inheritance) and the specific definition of a 'human being' in criminal homicide law. The ruling effectively placed the onus on the legislature to enact specific feticide statutes if it wished to criminalize the killing of an unborn fetus as homicide, a step many states subsequently took.
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