State v. Gregory
158 Wash. 2d 759, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A trial court commits a reversible error by refusing to conduct an in camera review of a victim's confidential dependency files when the defendant makes a plausible showing they contain material evidence. Nondisclosure of material impeachment evidence found in such files is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the case hinges on a credibility contest between the defendant and the victim.
Facts:
- In the early morning of August 21, 1998, R.S. was walking home when she approached a car she mistook for a friend's, which was occupied by Allen Eugene Gregory.
- Gregory offered R.S. a ride home, and after some hesitation, she accepted.
- Gregory drove R.S. to a parking lot behind a middle school instead of her home.
- R.S. alleged that Gregory brandished a knife, threatened her, and forcibly compelled her to engage in oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse.
- During the encounter, a condom that Gregory was wearing broke.
- After the incident, Gregory pushed R.S. out of his car, and she memorized his license plate number before running to a convenience store to call for help.
- Gregory's defense was that the encounter was consensual, claiming R.S. approached his car and offered to have sex for money.
- Gregory asserted that R.S. became angry and fabricated the rape accusation in retaliation after the condom broke and he refused her demand for more money.
Procedural Posture:
- Allen Eugene Gregory was charged with three counts of first-degree rape for a 1998 incident involving R.S.
- In Pierce County Superior Court (the trial court), Gregory moved to introduce evidence of R.S.’s past prostitution convictions, but the court excluded it as too remote.
- Gregory then requested an in camera review of the dependency files of R.S.'s children for more recent evidence of prostitution, which the trial court denied.
- A jury found Gregory guilty on all three rape counts, and he was sentenced to 331 months.
- Separately, Gregory was convicted of the 1996 aggravated first-degree murder of G.H. and was sentenced to death by a jury.
- Gregory appealed both the rape convictions and the murder conviction and death sentence directly to the Supreme Court of Washington, which consolidated the appeals.
- After oral argument, the Supreme Court remanded the rape case to the trial court with instructions to conduct the previously denied in camera review of the dependency files and report its findings.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and violate the defendant's due process rights by refusing to conduct an in camera review of the rape victim's children's confidential dependency files, where the defendant made a plausible showing that the files could contain material evidence relevant to his consent defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Bridge, J.
Yes. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct the in camera review, and the failure to disclose material impeachment evidence found within the files was not harmless error. The case was a credibility contest between Gregory and R.S. Gregory made a plausible showing that the dependency files of R.S.'s children, which were active during the relevant period, might contain evidence of recent prostitution material to his consent defense. Upon remand and review, the files revealed R.S. had recently lied to defense counsel during pretrial interviews about her drug use. This was material impeachment evidence relevant to her veracity. Because the State repeatedly emphasized that the jury's decision came down to who was more credible, there is not a reasonable probability that this additional impeachment evidence would have impacted the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the nondisclosure was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the rape convictions must be reversed. The death sentence in the separate murder case is also reversed because the jury considered the now-invalidated rape convictions and because the prosecutor committed misconduct in the penalty phase closing argument by discussing prison conditions the defense was barred from rebutting.
Dissenting - J.M. Johnson, J.
No. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to review the sealed dependency files based on the defendant's speculative request. The subsequent in camera review vindicated the trial judge's decision, as the files contained no evidence of recent prostitution, which was the entire basis for the defendant's motion. The majority erroneously seizes upon a minor, collateral piece of impeachment evidence—a lie about post-incident drug use—that would have been inadmissible as extrinsic evidence and would not have altered the jury's credibility determination, especially given the other impeachment material available and Gregory's own inconsistent stories. This decision wrongly undermines a valid jury verdict, disregards the rights of victims, and provides an unwarranted reversal of both a just rape conviction and a death sentence for a horrific, separate murder.
Concurring - Sanders, J.
Yes. The majority reaches the correct result to reverse the conviction, but for the wrong reasons. Reversal is required on two independent grounds the majority failed to recognize. First, the trial court's jury instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence, when consent is the direct opposite of forcible compulsion, an element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim's prior prostitution history under the rape shield statute; this evidence was highly relevant to the defendant's consent defense and motive to lie, and its exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a defense and confront his accuser.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the due process requirement under Pennsylvania v. Ritchie that a defendant is entitled to an in camera review of confidential records upon a 'plausible showing' that they contain material evidence. It demonstrates that 'materiality' extends not just to the evidence initially sought, but to any significant impeachment evidence discovered during the review, particularly in cases hinging on witness credibility. The reversal of the death sentence highlights the heightened scrutiny applied to capital penalty phases, establishing that a prosecutor cannot argue facts about prison conditions when the defense has been barred by a motion in limine from presenting rebuttal evidence on the same topic. This case underscores the tension between victim privacy statutes and a defendant's constitutional right to access potentially exculpatory information.
