State v. Greene
960 P.2d 980, 92 Wash. App. 80 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is a generally accepted scientific theory under the Frye standard. Expert testimony regarding DID is admissible on a case-by-case basis under ER 702 if it is relevant to a legal defense like insanity or diminished capacity and there are no significant indicia of malingering.
Facts:
- During his childhood, William Greene experienced severe physical, sexual, and emotional abuse and became a ward of the state at age eight.
- As an adult, Greene had an extensive criminal history and a substance abuse problem.
- While participating in a Sex Offender Treatment Program in prison, state mental health professionals diagnosed Greene with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), identifying 24 alternate identities or 'alters'.
- After his release from prison, Greene voluntarily continued weekly therapy with M.S., his former prison therapist, and was employed and maintaining stable relationships.
- In the weeks prior to April 1994, Greene's mental condition deteriorated due to an impending job layoff, leading his therapist M.S. to consider him a suicide risk.
- On April 29, 1994, M.S. visited Greene at his home out of concern for his mental state.
- During the visit, Greene's demeanor changed significantly; he sexually assaulted M.S. over a two-hour period, during which M.S. observed his affect to be that of a child.
- Following the assault, Greene's affect changed again; he tied and gagged M.S. before taking her car and leaving the apartment.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged William Greene in a Washington trial court with one count of indecent liberties and one count of first degree kidnapping.
- Greene entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, based on his diagnosis of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID).
- The State filed a motion to exclude all evidence and testimony related to DID, arguing it did not satisfy the Frye standard for novel scientific evidence.
- After a three-day Frye hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion, excluding the insanity defense and any evidence of DID for the purpose of a diminished capacity defense.
- A jury found Greene guilty on both counts.
- The trial court sentenced Greene to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a 'persistent offender.'
- Greene appealed his conviction to the Washington Supreme Court, and the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals of Washington for review.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by excluding all expert testimony and evidence regarding a defendant's Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) diagnosis, offered to support defenses of insanity and diminished capacity, on the grounds that DID is not generally accepted under the Frye standard and would not be helpful to a jury under ER 702?
Opinions:
Majority - Ellington, J.
Yes, a trial court errs by excluding such evidence. Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and therefore satisfies the Frye standard, and testimony regarding the disorder can be helpful to a jury in assessing defenses of insanity and diminished capacity under ER 702. The court's reasoning proceeded in two parts. First, under the Frye standard, the proper inquiry is whether the scientific theory itself—here, the existence of DID as a mental disorder—is generally accepted, not whether the scientific community has reached a consensus on its relationship to a legal concept like insanity. The court found that DID's inclusion in the DSM-IV, combined with testimony from both defense and state experts confirming an 80% acceptance rate among professionals, demonstrated that it meets the Frye test for general acceptance as a matter of law. Second, under ER 702, the court established a case-by-case approach to determine if the testimony would be helpful to the jury. This involves a two-part inquiry into relevance and reliability. Evidence of DID was relevant here because testimony suggested an alter with the mental capacity of a young child was in control during the indecent liberties, which pertains to the insanity defense's requirement of understanding the nature and wrongfulness of the act. It was also relevant to diminished capacity for both charges, as the disorder could have prevented Greene from forming the required specific intent. To address reliability and concerns about faking (malingering), the court identified several factors to consider. Applying these, the court found no obvious signs of malingering in Greene's case, as he was diagnosed by the state years before the crime, had a corroborated history of abuse, and exhibited symptoms of DID just before the events.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for establishing in Washington that Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) satisfies the Frye test, moving the admissibility question from a threshold challenge of the disorder's existence to a more nuanced, case-specific analysis under ER 702. By rejecting a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility, the court created a flexible framework for trial courts to evaluate evidence of DID. This approach balances a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense with the state's interest in preventing fraudulent claims of mental incapacity, setting a key precedent for how courts must handle complex psychological defenses in the future.
