State v. Grant
623 So. 2d 204, 1993 WL 310817 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
An individual can be held liable as a principal to second-degree murder under Louisiana's felony-murder rule if their actions contributed to the perpetration of the underlying felony (e.g., robbery), even if another party committed the fatal act and the individual claims to have only intended a lesser crime or to have retreated.
Facts:
- On April 20, 1989, Keith Foster and Ervin Ford drove from Texas to Shreveport, Louisiana, seeking to purchase cocaine from someone named "Big Boy."
- Foster and Ford encountered Robert Grant, Terry Mays, and Wendell Leshay in the Mooretown area of Shreveport, who had been drinking alcohol.
- Grant indicated to Foster that he had drugs for sale, leaned into Foster's car, turned off the engine, and removed the ignition key.
- As Grant backed away, Mays pulled a sawed-off shotgun, pointed it at Foster, and demanded money.
- Both Foster and Ford gave Mays their money.
- Mays then shot Foster in the left side of his neck, killing him.
- After the shooting, Grant, Mays, and Leshay fled the scene.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Grant was convicted of second-degree murder in a Louisiana trial court.
- Grant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
- Grant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was a principal to the crime of second-degree murder.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence exist to convict an individual as a principal to second-degree murder when that individual participated in a robbery that led to a killing, despite claiming to have intended only a simple robbery and to have fled before the fatal shot was fired?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown
Yes, sufficient evidence exists to convict an individual as a principal to second-degree murder when that individual participated in a robbery that led to a killing, even if they claim to have only intended a simple robbery and to have fled before the fatal shot. The court affirmed Grant's conviction, holding that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Under LSA-R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2), second-degree murder includes a killing committed during an armed robbery, even without intent to kill. LSA-R.S. 14:24 states that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, or whether they directly commit the act, aid and abet, or counsel another, are principals. The jury, as the trier of fact, was entitled to resolve conflicting inferences from the evidence and determine credibility. The court found that common sense dictates the car keys were taken to prevent Foster's escape, and by themselves, the keys had no value to Grant. A reasonable juror could conclude that Grant aided and abetted the robbery that resulted in Foster's death, as the taking of the keys was part of the entire incident. Furthermore, the jury was free to accept eyewitness Ms. Lee's testimony that neither Grant nor Mays ran until after the shot was fired, which contradicted Grant's claim of early retreat. Therefore, even if Grant did not intend for the victim to be killed, his actions as a principal in the armed robbery made him guilty of second-degree murder.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the breadth of the felony-murder rule and the definition of 'principal' under Louisiana law, demonstrating that an individual's participation in any part of a dangerous felony can lead to liability for a resulting death, even if they claim a lesser intent or a withdrawal. It underscores the difficulty of delineating one's involvement in a rapidly unfolding criminal event and highlights the deference appellate courts give to jury findings of fact and credibility. Future cases involving complex accomplice liability in felony-murder scenarios will likely cite this case, particularly when defendants argue for a narrow interpretation of their involvement.
