State v. Grant
79 Mo. 113 (1883)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory amendment that removes a legal disability, such as testimonial incompetence, which was imposed as part of a criminal judgment, does not apply retroactively to individuals convicted before the amendment. The legislature cannot retroactively alter a final judicial judgment, as this would unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary and the executive's exclusive pardoning power.
Facts:
- Grant and others allegedly stole a quantity of butter.
- Later that night, a policeman named Jones observed Grant walking on the street carrying a bundle.
- Jones, finding Grant's behavior suspicious, attempted to arrest him.
- During the attempted arrest, Grant shot and killed Jones.
- The theft of the butter was not discovered or confirmed until the morning after Jones was killed.
- Prior to this incident, Grant had made general threats against 'policemen'.
Procedural Posture:
- Grant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in a state trial court.
- On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial in a prior decision.
- The case was retried, but the first jury failed to reach a verdict.
- At a subsequent retrial, the court permitted a witness, Miller, to testify for the State over the defendant's objection that Miller was incompetent due to a prior larceny conviction from 1878.
- The jury convicted Grant of first-degree murder.
- Grant appealed the conviction to the Missouri Supreme Court, which is the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a statutory amendment that removes testimonial incompetency as a penalty for a crime apply retroactively to a person convicted of that crime before the amendment was enacted?
Opinions:
Majority - Sherwood, J.
No. A statutory amendment removing testimonial incompetency as a criminal penalty does not apply retroactively to convictions that occurred before its passage. First, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislature expresses a clear and unambiguous intent for retroactive application, which is absent here. Second, even if such intent existed, the act would be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. The disability to testify was part of the punishment and thus part of the final judicial judgment. The legislature cannot alter a court's final judgment, as this usurps judicial power. Furthermore, remitting any portion of a criminal sentence is an exercise of the pardoning power, which is vested exclusively in the executive branch.
Dissenting - Henry, J.
This opinion concurs in the reversal but dissents from the majority's reasoning on a separate evidentiary issue. The dissent argues that evidence of the butter theft, which was unknown to the officer at the time of the attempted arrest, should not have been admissible. The justification for an arrest must be based on facts and circumstances known to the officer at that moment, not on after-acquired information about the suspect's guilt. Admitting evidence of the theft served only to prejudice the jury against the defendant, as the motive to resist arrest was already apparent from the events of the homicide itself.
Analysis:
This case establishes a strong precedent for the separation of powers by strictly limiting the legislature's ability to retroactively alter the consequences of a final criminal judgment. The court's reasoning distinguishes between permissible changes to procedural rules and impermissible encroachments on judicial and executive functions. By defining the testimonial disability as an integral part of the punishment and judgment, the decision protects the finality of judicial sentences from legislative interference. This ruling reinforces the principle that once a judgment is rendered, only judicial review or an executive pardon can alter its effects.
