State v. Gounagias
153 P. 9, 1915 Wash. LEXIS 1122, 88 Wash. 304 (1915)
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Rule of Law:
For a provocation to be legally adequate to mitigate a charge of premeditated murder, it must be one that would cause sudden, intense anger or heat of blood in an ordinary person. A provocation which does not cause instant resentment but is instead brooded over for a significant period is insufficient to negate premeditation.
Facts:
- On April 19, 1914, Dionisios Grounas (also known as Dan George) sexually assaulted Gounagias while Gounagias was intoxicated and helpless.
- The following day, Gounagias confronted Grounas, who laughingly dismissed the assault. Gounagias then asked Grounas to keep the incident private.
- Grounas proceeded to tell their mutual countrymen about the assault.
- For the next three weeks, Gounagias was repeatedly subjected to ridicule, insulting remarks, and gestures from his countrymen regarding the assault, causing him severe distress.
- On the evening of May 6, 1914, while at a coffee house, Gounagias was again met with laughing remarks and gestures from others about the incident.
- Gounagias claimed this final instance of mockery enraged him, causing him to form the immediate design to kill Grounas.
- He ran to his home, retrieved a revolver he had purchased weeks earlier, went to Grounas's house, and found him asleep in bed.
- Gounagias then shot Grounas five times in the head, killing him.
Procedural Posture:
- Gounagias was charged with murder in the first degree in the trial court of Clarke County, Washington.
- At trial, the court excluded evidence of provocation offered by the defense to mitigate the charge.
- The trial court also refused to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of manslaughter.
- A jury found Gounagias guilty of murder in the first degree.
- The trial court denied Gounagias's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict.
- Gounagias, as the appellant, appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does evidence of a past sexual assault and subsequent, repeated mockery by third parties constitute legally adequate provocation to mitigate a charge of murder when approximately three weeks have passed between the initial wrong and the killing?
Opinions:
Majority - Ellis, J.
No. Evidence of a past wrong and subsequent mockery does not constitute legally adequate provocation when a significant cooling-off period has elapsed. To mitigate a murder charge, the killing must be committed under the influence of a sudden, intense passion produced by an adequate provocation, before reason has had time to reassert itself. While the question of what constitutes adequate provocation and a reasonable cooling time are generally for the jury, the court must first determine as a matter of law whether the offered evidence has any tendency to prove such provocation. Here, the alleged provocation was not a new act by the deceased but a repeated reminder of a wrong that occurred three weeks earlier. The law does not recognize a 'cumulative' anger that builds over time; sudden anger, by its nature, cannot be cumulative. A provocation that is brooded over does not negate premeditation but rather tends to prove it. Therefore, the trial court was correct to exclude the evidence, as it did not tend to show the sudden heat of blood required for mitigation, but instead demonstrated a thought-out design to kill.
Analysis:
This case establishes a critical boundary for the 'heat of passion' or adequate provocation doctrine. It clarifies that a long-standing grievance, even one stemming from a severe initial wrong, cannot serve as legal mitigation if a significant 'cooling-off' period has passed. The court's rejection of a 'cumulative provocation' theory reinforces the requirement that the emotional disturbance must be sudden and immediate. This decision solidifies the trial court's gatekeeping function in assessing the legal sufficiency of provocation evidence before it can be presented to a jury, distinguishing legally cognizable 'sudden passion' from a thought-out, albeit emotionally driven, plan for revenge.
