State v. Gonzalez
507 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 12, 162 P.3d 650, 216 Ariz. 11 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Courts must apply the plain and unambiguous language of a criminal sentencing statute as it is written and may not judicially expand its scope to include offenses not explicitly listed, even if the omission appears to be a legislative oversight or leads to an illogical result.
Facts:
- Francisco Gonzalez, Jr., who was at least eighteen years of age, committed an act constituting attempted second-degree sexual conduct.
- The victim of this act was a minor under the age of fifteen.
- For the purposes of the legal challenge, it was accepted by all parties and the court that the victim was eleven years old at the time of the offense.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in the trial court convicted Francisco Gonzalez, Jr. of attempted second-degree sexual conduct with a minor.
- The trial court initially placed Gonzalez on probation.
- Gonzalez's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the intermediate appellate court.
- After Gonzalez violated his probation, the trial court revoked it and sentenced him to a 7.5-year term of imprisonment.
- Gonzalez filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court, arguing his sentence was illegal under the relevant statute.
- The trial court denied Gonzalez's petition for post-conviction relief.
- Gonzalez filed a petition for review in the intermediate appellate court, seeking review of the trial court's denial.
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Issue:
Does the special sentencing statute for dangerous crimes against children, A.R.S. § 13-604.01, apply to the offense of attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of twelve when the statute's plain language does not explicitly include that specific offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Howard, Presiding Judge
No. The special sentencing statute, A.R.S. § 13-604.01, does not apply to the offense of attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of twelve because the statute's plain language does not encompass this specific crime. The court's primary duty is to give effect to the language of the statute as written. While the legislature likely intended to punish such crimes severely, and it seems illogical to punish a crime against a twelve-year-old more severely than one against an eleven-year-old, the court cannot rewrite the law to correct an apparent legislative oversight. Doing so would violate the separation of powers and raise constitutional due process concerns regarding fair warning of proscribed conduct and authorized sentences. The function of defining crimes and fixing penalties belongs exclusively to the legislature, not the judiciary.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the principle of strict construction for criminal statutes and the doctrine of separation of powers. It establishes that courts will not 'fix' drafting errors in sentencing laws, even when the literal interpretation leads to an absurd result, particularly when doing so would be detrimental to a defendant. This decision places the burden squarely on the legislature to be precise and comprehensive when drafting criminal statutes. It signifies that defendants' due process rights to fair warning of potential punishments can outweigh a court's desire to fulfill the perceived, but unwritten, intent of the legislature.
