State v. Gomez
475 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 6, 212 Ariz. 55, 127 P.3d 873 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Under Arizona's Proposition 200 (A.R.S. § 13-901.01), the statutory language disqualifying a defendant who "has been convicted of or indicted for a violent crime" from mandatory probation for a drug offense applies only to defendants who, at the time of sentencing, stand convicted of or are under a pending indictment for a violent crime; it does not apply to a previously dismissed indictment.
Facts:
- In 1994, Melissa Jean Gomez was indicted for manslaughter, which qualifies as a violent crime under Arizona law.
- In 1995, the prosecutor dismissed the manslaughter indictment after concluding there was no reasonable likelihood of conviction.
- In 2003, Gomez was convicted for possession of marijuana and methamphetamine.
- At the time of her 2003 drug offenses, Gomez was on parole for a different, unrelated offense.
Procedural Posture:
- Melissa Jean Gomez was convicted of drug possession at a bench trial in the Arizona trial court.
- The trial court ruled that Gomez was ineligible for mandatory probation under Proposition 200 due to a prior, dismissed indictment for manslaughter.
- The trial court sentenced Gomez to concurrent prison terms.
- Gomez, as appellant, appealed her sentence to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the statute did disqualify Gomez, but it vacated the sentence on the separate constitutional ground that the statute violated the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey.
- The State, as petitioner, sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a previously dismissed indictment for a violent crime disqualify a defendant from mandatory probation for a non-violent drug offense under A.R.S. § 13-901.01(B)?
Opinions:
Majority - Bales, J.
No. A defendant is not disqualified from mandatory probation under Proposition 200 based merely on a previously dismissed indictment for a violent crime. The statutory phrase "has been convicted of or indicted for a violent crime" is ambiguous because a literal reading would lead to absurd results, such as including reversed convictions, which even the State concedes is incorrect. To give effect to the voters' intent—treating non-violent drug offenders while imprisoning violent ones—and to avoid serious constitutional due process and equal protection concerns, the court interprets the disqualification to apply only when a defendant stands convicted of, or is under a pending indictment for, a violent crime at the time of sentencing for the drug offense. This construction avoids punishing individuals who are not in fact violent offenders and prevents arbitrary distinctions based on the charging method of a prior, dismissed case.
Dissenting - Berch, V.C.J.
Yes. The plain language of A.R.S. § 13-901.01(B) disqualifies anyone who has ever been "indicted" for a violent crime from receiving mandatory probation. This interpretation is rational, as an indictment represents a grand jury's finding of probable cause and serves as a reasonable screening mechanism to identify potentially violent offenders who should not receive automatic probation. This statutory scheme does not violate due process because it only removes eligibility for mandatory probation; a defendant can still seek discretionary probation under other statutes and contest the basis of the prior indictment at that stage. The majority improperly inserts the word "pending" into the statute, contrary to the clear intent of the voters who passed the initiative.
Analysis:
This case serves as a key example of statutory interpretation where a court rejects a literal, plain-meaning reading to avoid absurd results and constitutional issues. By narrowing the scope of the "violent offender" exception in Proposition 200, the Arizona Supreme Court reinforced the initiative's primary goal of providing treatment for non-violent offenders. The decision establishes the important precedent that a mere accusation, such as a dismissed indictment, cannot carry the same long-term disqualifying consequences as a standing conviction. This ruling protects defendants from being penalized based on unsubstantiated historical charges and illustrates the power of the canon of constitutional avoidance in statutory construction.
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