State v. Gomaz
141 Wis. 2d 302, 1987 Wisc. LEXIS 711, 414 N.W.2d 626 (1987)
Rule of Law:
When a trial court instructs the jury on the privilege of perfect self-defense, it commits reversible error by refusing to also instruct on the lesser-included offense of imperfect self-defense, as these concepts differ only in the reasonableness of the actor's belief or force used. An objection to a proposed instruction's omission is preserved if counsel has submitted a written request and, during the instructions conference, explicitly redirects the court's attention to the specific requested instruction as the basis for the objection.
Facts:
- Edward Coffey died in Frances Gomaz's apartment on September 15, 1985, as the result of a 'double-struck' stab wound to the heart, inflicted by Gomaz.
- Gomaz was 51 years old, 4 feet 11.5 inches tall, and weighed between 130 and 140 pounds; Coffey was 36 years old, 6 feet 0.5 inches tall, and weighed approximately 220 pounds.
- Gomaz testified that Coffey had physically abused and severely beaten her the day preceding his death, a claim substantiated by a physician's testimony of multiple bruises and soft-tissue trauma.
- Gomaz also claimed Coffey had a violent disposition, particularly when intoxicated, and presented witness testimony to support this reputation (though autopsy samples did not detect alcohol or drugs in Coffey).
- On the day Coffey was killed, Gomaz admitted that she had been drinking alcohol prior to the stabbing incident.
- Gomaz claimed she took a knife from a kitchen drawer and held it in front of herself, telling Coffey to stay away when he approached her with outstretched hands toward her neck in what she perceived as a life-threatening manner.
- Gomaz testified that she froze when Coffey approached, and he pushed himself upon her, causing him to 'go into the knife' she was holding, without her intentionally thrusting it.
- Gomaz was not immediately aware Coffey had been injured, observing him walk to a kitchen table and sit down before his body was later found on the floor adjacent to her bed.
Procedural Posture:
- Frances Gomaz was convicted of first-degree murder while using a dangerous weapon in the circuit court for Kenosha County, Judge David M. Bastian.
- Gomaz appealed her conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense while simultaneously instructing on perfect self-defense.
- The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, seeking a determination on the proper application of State v. Sarabia where a defendant requests instructions on both perfect and imperfect self-defense.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense when it finds reasonable grounds to instruct on perfect self-defense, and is such an objection adequately preserved under Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) when defense counsel has submitted a written request and orally refers to the requested instruction as the basis for objection?
Opinions:
Majority - Louis J. Ceci, J.
Yes, a trial court commits reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense when it finds reasonable grounds to instruct on perfect self-defense, and such an objection is adequately preserved by defense counsel’s actions. The court affirmed that, under Ross v. State, where a jury is properly instructed on perfect self-defense, it is inconsistent and improper to deny an instruction for imperfect self-defense (manslaughter), because the two concepts differ only in the factual determination of the 'reasonableness' of the actor's belief or the amount of force used. Perfect self-defense requires both belief and force to be reasonable, while imperfect self-defense applies when the actor actually believed force was necessary but the belief or force was unreasonable. The court clarified that State v. Sarabia applies equally when both perfect and imperfect self-defense instructions are requested, meaning the jury can disbelieve the defendant's exculpatory testimony but still find the lesser offense based on other evidence. However, the court found the 'inconsistency' rule articulated in State v. Johnnies and Sarabia inapplicable here, because Gomaz’s actions, from intentionally wielding and threatening with the knife to Coffey forcing himself upon it, constituted 'one continuing act of self-defense.' Therefore, her claim of an unintentional stabbing was not conceptually inconsistent with an intentional threat of force. Regarding the preservation of objection, the court held that defense counsel's initial statement (appearing to withdraw the request for imperfect self-defense) was a clarification, not a withdrawal, especially as counsel later redirected the court's attention to the written request for the specific instruction (Wisconsin Jury Instruction — Criminal 1141). Citing Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) and Bethards v. State, the court concluded that submitting an alternative instruction and then identifying its omission as the basis for objection sufficiently states the grounds with particularity, thereby preserving the objection for appeal. The court emphasized that requiring specific legal argument for every objection would unduly burden the instructions conference, contrary to the statute's purpose. Because the refusal to instruct on imperfect self-defense concerned a crucial aspect of Gomaz's defense, the error was prejudicial, necessitating reversal and a new trial.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the landscape of self-defense instructions in Wisconsin, establishing a critical link between perfect and imperfect self-defense that mandates the latter's instruction when the former is given. It refines the 'inconsistency' doctrine, allowing for claims of self-defense even when the ultimate act leading to death might be unintentional, provided it occurs within a continuous act of self-defense (an intentional threat of force that results in an unintentional killing). Crucially, the decision provides explicit guidance on how defense counsel can effectively preserve objections to omitted jury instructions by simply referring to their previously submitted written requests, fostering judicial economy while safeguarding defendants' appellate rights. This precedent strengthens criminal defendants' ability to present a full range of defenses and ensures that courts provide juries with comprehensive legal options consistent with the evidence presented.
