State v. Getzinger
76 P.3d 148, 189 Or. App. 431, 2003 Ore. App. LEXIS 1208 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A person cannot be held criminally liable for introducing contraband into a correctional facility if they are not in possession of the contraband at the time of entry because an officer has already removed it from their person.
Facts:
- Defendant went to the Multnomah County Courthouse to respond to an outstanding bench warrant.
- A judge informed defendant that he was going to be taken into custody and instructed him to wait in the hall.
- While waiting for four to six minutes, defendant made several phone calls.
- Deputy Farrell arrived, informed defendant he was under arrest, and frisked him.
- During the frisk, Deputy Farrell removed defendant's wallet, which contained methamphetamine, and placed it into a property bag.
- Deputy Farrell then transported both defendant and the property bag containing the wallet to the courthouse jail facility.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Oregon charged defendant with supplying contraband.
- At a bench trial in the trial court, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the state failed to prove a voluntary act.
- The trial court denied the motion and found defendant guilty.
- Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Oregon.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit the voluntary act required for the crime of introducing contraband into a jail when an arresting officer discovers the contraband, removes it from the defendant's possession, and then brings both the defendant and the contraband into the facility?
Opinions:
Majority - Linder, J.
No. A defendant cannot be said to have committed the act that gives rise to criminal liability if they were not in possession of the contraband when taken into the jail. The criminal act at issue is the introduction of drugs into the jail. Here, the arresting officer, Farrell, took possession of the defendant's wallet containing the drugs before they entered the jail. Therefore, Farrell, not the defendant, committed the physical act of introducing the contraband into the facility. The state's argument that the defendant's prior voluntary acts—possessing the drugs and failing to discard them when he had the chance—led to the introduction fails because the defendant himself did not perform the prohibited act, even involuntarily. Citing its prior decision in State v. Tippetts, the court reiterated that a voluntary act requires the ability to choose whether to commit the act giving rise to criminal liability, and in this case, the act of introduction was performed by the officer.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of criminal liability for introducing contraband into a correctional facility under Oregon law. It establishes a clear factual boundary: if law enforcement takes possession of the contraband before entry into the facility, the defendant cannot be guilty of the act of introduction. This ruling breaks the chain of causation that prosecutors might try to establish from a defendant's prior voluntary acts, such as possessing the drugs. The case solidifies the principle that the defendant must, at a minimum, be the one who performs the prohibited physical act, even if their presence at the location is involuntary. Future cases involving similar charges will now hinge on the precise moment law enforcement took control of the contraband relative to the entry into the facility.
