State v. Geske
810 N.W.2d 226, 2012 WI App 15, 339 Wis. 2d 170 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
In first-degree reckless homicide cases, a last-moment evasive maneuver, such as swerving to avoid a collision, does not negate the 'utter disregard for human life' element if the totality of the defendant's conduct demonstrates an extreme indifference to life. The court must consider all circumstances, including speed, intoxication, notice of danger, and the ineffectiveness of the evasive action.
Facts:
- Anrietta Geske consumed prescription medication and alcohol at a bar.
- Geske then drove her Porsche convertible on South Oneida Street in Green Bay, a well-traveled commercial strip.
- Tyler Hampton and Elizabeth Sadowsky observed Geske's Porsche pass them at an estimated 80-85 miles per hour, without braking, through a red light at Willard Drive.
- Geske's view of the intersection at Willard Drive was obscured by a large sign.
- Geske testified that she inadvertently accelerated and ran the red light while reaching for her small dog, which had become loose in the vehicle.
- Geske's Porsche struck a Buick, killing its two occupants.
- Police officers and other public safety professionals testified that the wreckage was the most severe they had ever seen.
- Geske's blood alcohol content was .072 about two hours after the crash.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury found Anrietta Geske guilty of two counts of first-degree reckless homicide and one count of recklessly endangering safety; two additional homicide counts were dismissed at sentencing as multiplicitous.
- Geske filed a motion for postconviction relief in the circuit court.
- The circuit court denied Geske's motion for postconviction relief.
- Geske appealed the judgment of conviction and the order denying her postconviction motion to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's last-moment swerve to avoid a collision negate the 'utter disregard for human life' element required for first-degree reckless homicide when the defendant was driving at extreme speeds, intoxicated, ran a red light, and had an obscured view, under a totality of the circumstances analysis?
Opinions:
Majority - Hoover, P.J.
No, a defendant's last-moment swerve to avoid a collision does not negate the 'utter disregard for human life' element for first-degree reckless homicide when the defendant was driving at extreme speeds, intoxicated, ran a red light, and had an obscured view, given the totality of the circumstances. The court affirmed Geske's conviction, finding sufficient evidence for the 'utter disregard for human life' element. While previous cases like Wagner and Balistreri found that swerving indicated some regard for life, the determination must be made based on the 'totality of the circumstances,' not a per se rule. In Geske's case, driving over eighty miles per hour on a well-traveled city street, after consuming alcohol and prescription pills, and running a red light without braking (despite an obscured view), demonstrated an utter disregard for human life. The court distinguished this case from Wagner because Geske had ample notice of potential victims due to the red light, unlike the unexpected appearance of the victim in Wagner. Furthermore, Geske's extreme speed significantly reduced the likelihood of avoiding a collision, and Balistreri involved lower speeds, sobriety, and more extensive evasive maneuvers resulting in less severe outcomes. Regarding the accident reconstruction computer simulation (EDSMAC), the court held that the State was not required to disclose it prior to trial because it did not 'intend to offer' it as evidence initially, but only used it in rebuttal after Geske's expert testified about the program. The court found that a four-hour delay in disclosure was not unreasonable under the continuing duty to disclose. It also determined the simulation had sufficient foundation and probative value, as any faults in variables were addressed during cross-examination, and its purpose was to undermine the defense expert's speed estimate, not precisely re-create the accident. Finally, the court found no error in sentencing discretion, as the court properly considered primary factors and the defendant's lack of remorse as evidenced by her 'perjured' testimony, which is a permissible factor when related to remorse.
Analysis:
This case refines the 'utter disregard for human life' standard in reckless homicide, clarifying that a last-moment evasive maneuver, like swerving, is not a per se defense. It underscores the importance of the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis, especially considering factors such as extreme speed, intoxication, forewarning of danger (e.g., a red light at an intersection), and the effectiveness of the evasive action. This decision limits the precedential value of older cases like Wagner and Balistreri, emphasizing that context matters more than isolated actions, and strengthens the prosecution's ability to secure convictions in cases of highly reckless driving.
