State v. Gary
2005 Conn. LEXIS 125, 273 Conn. 393, 869 A.2d 1236 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
The specific intent to kill required for a murder conviction can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the defendant's motive, the type of weapon used, and the manner of its use, even when the defendant misses the intended victim and kills a third party.
Facts:
- Steven Gary, the victim Efraim Gilliard, and Samuel Mabry went to the Live Wire Club together.
- Gary gave a gun to Gilliard, who concealed it and successfully smuggled it past security into the club.
- Inside the crowded club, Gary and another patron, Jemar Sanders, engaged in a verbal altercation.
- Sanders punched Gary in the head with his fist.
- In response, Gary obtained the gun, bent over, and then stood up with the pistol in his hand.
- Gary raised the gun to shoulder height and fired a single shot.
- The bullet missed Sanders but struck and killed Gilliard, who was standing two or three feet away from Gary.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Connecticut charged Steven Gary in the trial court with murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm.
- The State's theory for the murder charge was transferred intent, arguing Gary intended to kill Jemar Sanders but killed Efraim Gilliard instead.
- The defendant, Gary, twice moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence, both of which the trial court denied.
- The jury found Gary guilty on all counts.
- After the verdict, a juror sent a letter to the trial judge expressing post-verdict doubts about the intent element.
- Gary filed a motion for a mistrial, arguing the verdict was not unanimous, and requested an evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct.
- The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial and the request for a hearing, and subsequently rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
- Gary appealed his murder conviction to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, claiming insufficiency of the evidence for intent to kill and improper denial of his post-verdict motions.
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Issue:
Does sufficient circumstantial evidence exist for a jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant possessed the specific intent to kill, as required for a murder conviction under a theory of transferred intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Sullivan, C. J.
Yes, sufficient circumstantial evidence exists for a jury to find the specific intent to kill. A jury can reasonably infer a defendant's intent to kill from the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, including motive, the use of a deadly weapon, the manner in which the weapon was used, and the events leading to the death. Here, the evidence showed that Sanders punched the defendant, providing a motive. The defendant responded by drawing a loaded pistol, raising it to shoulder height, and firing it in Sanders's direction. From these facts—the motive, the use of a deadly weapon, and the manner of its use—a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant had the conscious objective to cause Sanders's death and, under the doctrine of transferred intent, is guilty of murdering the victim who was unintentionally killed.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the principle that specific intent, a critical element in crimes like murder, can be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence. The decision underscores the high deference appellate courts give to a jury's factual findings and inferences, particularly regarding a defendant's state of mind. It clarifies that a defendant's 'bad aim' does not negate intent to kill as a matter of law and that a motive for murder need not be proportional to the act of killing. The opinion also strongly affirms the finality of jury verdicts by refusing to investigate a juror's post-verdict doubts, treating them as internal mental operations rather than reviewable misconduct.
