State v. Gardner
1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 878, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 601 N.W.2d 670 (1999)
Rule of Law:
The involuntary intoxication defense is available when the intoxication is caused by prescription medication taken as directed, even if the defendant was aware of potential intoxicating effects, provided the intoxication rendered the defendant incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. For armed burglary, a conviction does not require a nexus between the weapon and the facilitation of the burglary, as the mere presence of a weapon during a burglary inherently increases danger.
Facts:
- In August 1995, David J. Gardner's wife informed him she no longer wanted to be married to him, leading to Gardner becoming depressed.
- Gardner checked into a hospital for depression treatment and began taking the antidepressant paroxetine, commonly known as Paxil.
- While hospitalized, Gardner was served with a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from going to the marital home.
- Three days after his release, Gardner went to the marital home, entered the garage carrying a large knife, removed his wife's cellular phone from her car, disconnected the car battery, and taped a screwdriver in the garage door tracks.
- When Gardner's wife opened the garage door, Gardner took her upstairs to the bedroom.
- Gardner and his wife subsequently had sexual intercourse in the bedroom.
Procedural Posture:
- David J. Gardner was charged with armed burglary, false imprisonment while armed, and second-degree sexual assault.
- Gardner sought to introduce expert psychiatric testimony from Dr. Herzl Spiro regarding the effects of Paxil to support an involuntary intoxication defense.
- The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Spiro's testimony.
- The trial court, after hearing a lengthy offer of proof from Dr. Spiro, excluded his testimony.
- After a jury trial, Gardner was convicted of armed burglary, false imprisonment while armed, and second-degree sexual assault.
- Gardner appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding his expert's testimony and that a conviction for armed burglary requires a nexus between the weapon and the burglary.
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Issue:
1. Does the involuntary intoxication defense, based on prescription medication taken as directed, apply only when the defendant was unaware of the medication's intoxicating effects, and must expert testimony supporting this defense assert that the intoxication rendered the defendant incapable of distinguishing right from wrong? 2. Does a conviction for armed burglary require a nexus between the weapon carried and the facilitation of the burglary, beyond the mere presence of the weapon?
Opinions:
Majority - BROWN, P. J.
No, the involuntary intoxication defense is available when the intoxication was due to prescription medication taken as directed, even if the defendant was aware of potential intoxicating effects, but expert testimony supporting the defense must assert that the intoxication affected the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong. The court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the expert testimony, agreeing that the involuntary intoxication defense is applicable for prescription medication taken as directed, regardless of the defendant's knowledge of potential intoxicating effects. This aligns with Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b) and Texas case law (citing Shurbet v. State). However, the court found Gardner's expert's (Dr. Spiro) offer of proof inadequate. The defense requires showing that the intoxication rendered the defendant incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, a standard coextensive with the mental responsibility test for insanity under § 971.15(1), Stats. Dr. Spiro's testimony failed to assert this; in fact, he stated that Gardner 'knows right from wrong,' thus not meeting the required evidentiary threshold to put involuntary intoxication at issue for the jury. No, a conviction for armed burglary does not require a nexus between the weapon carried and the facilitation of the burglary. The court cited State v. Norris, which held that the armed burglary statute (§ 943.10(2)(b), Stats.) does not require a nexus between the weapon and the burglary's facilitation. Norris distinguished this from general weapon enhancers where a nexus is required, explaining that in a burglary, the mere presence of a weapon always increases the danger and 'enhances the prospect of danger.' The court deemed Gardner's attempts to distinguish Norris unpersuasive, affirming that the armed burglary statute focuses on the increased risk posed by a weapon's presence, not its direct utility in the crime's execution. The court also summarily rejected Gardner's constitutional challenge to the penalty structure, finding a rational basis for punishing armed offenses more severely due to the inherent danger a weapon presents.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the involuntary intoxication defense in Wisconsin, particularly regarding prescription medication. It broadens the applicability of the defense by rejecting a 'lack of knowledge' requirement for intoxicating side effects, recognizing that patients often have little choice but to follow medical advice. However, it maintains a strict evidentiary standard, requiring expert testimony to demonstrate that the medication rendered the defendant utterly incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, aligning it with the insanity defense. For armed burglary, the ruling reinforces that the statute focuses on the heightened risk associated with weapons, not their direct use in facilitating the crime. This means prosecutors do not need to prove a functional link between the weapon and the burglary, easing the burden in such cases and emphasizing public safety concerns. Future defendants seeking an involuntary intoxication defense based on prescription drugs must ensure their expert testimony directly addresses the 'right from wrong' capacity and provides a strong evidentiary foundation, beyond speculative possibilities.
