State v. Gardner
2006 WI App 92, 715 N.W.2d 720, 292 Wis. 2d 682 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal statute that prohibits operating a vehicle with any detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in one's blood when such operation causes great bodily harm is constitutional, as it does not create unconstitutional presumptions of guilt, constitute a status offense, or violate due process by eliminating a direct causal link between drug use and injury or by shifting the burden of proof for an affirmative defense.
Facts:
- On December 20, 2003, Eric Benjamin Gardner crashed the motor vehicle he was driving into a tree a few blocks from his home.
- Michelle Marino, who was riding in the front passenger seat of Gardner's vehicle, was severely injured as a result of the crash.
- At the scene, Gardner told officers he must have fallen asleep and insisted he had only consumed one beer and no other controlled substances.
- Gardner consented to a blood test.
- Approximately three hours after the crash, Gardner's blood was drawn for testing.
- Gardner's blood test results showed no alcohol but revealed substantial amounts of cocaine and the metabolites of cocaine.
Procedural Posture:
- In March 2004, Eric Benjamin Gardner was charged in the trial court with one count of injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle (great bodily harm), in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(am).
- Gardner filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional.
- The trial court denied Gardner's motion to dismiss.
- Gardner then entered a no contest plea to the single charged count.
- The trial court sentenced Gardner to eight years in prison, consisting of four years of initial confinement followed by four years of extended supervision.
- Judgment was entered by the trial court.
- Gardner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Is Wisconsin Statute § 940.25(1)(am), which prohibits causing great bodily harm while operating a vehicle with any detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in one's blood, unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment for creating presumptions of guilt, punishing a 'status,' eliminating a causal link between drug use and injury, or improperly shifting the burden of proof through its affirmative defense?
Opinions:
Majority - WEDEMEYER, PJ.
No, Wisconsin Statute § 940.25(1)(am) is not unconstitutional as applied to Gardner because it does not violate due process rights, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, create presumptions of guilt, establish a 'status offense,' or improperly shift the burden of proof. The court explained that the statute defines a criminal offense with two elements that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant operated a vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in their blood; and (2) the operation of the vehicle caused great bodily harm. This framework does not create unconstitutional presumptions of guilt, as the statute merely defines the elements of the crime without directing the fact-finder to presume any element from basic facts, distinguishing it from problematic presumptions identified in Tot v. United States, Ulster County Court v. Allen, and Sandstrom v. Montana. Furthermore, the statute penalizes specific conduct (driving with illegal substances and causing injury), not merely the status of being a drug addict, consistent with Powell v. Texas and not violating Robinson v. California. The legislature possesses the inherent power to define criminal conduct, and the statute's lack of a requirement to prove a causal link between the drug's effect and the injury is a reasonable exercise of police power to promote public safety, as previously upheld in State v. Smet and State v. Caibaiosai. Finally, the affirmative defense provided in Wis. Stat. § 940.25(2)(a), which allows a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm would have occurred regardless of the drug use and with due care, does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof because due process permits placing the burden of an affirmative defense on the defendant without relieving the State of proving the elements of the crime, as established in State v. McGee.
Analysis:
This case significantly reaffirms the broad legislative authority to define criminal offenses, especially concerning public safety. It clarifies that 'zero-tolerance' drug driving statutes, which penalize driving with any detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance when it causes injury, are constitutional even without requiring proof of impairment or a direct causal link between the substance and the injury. The decision highlights the critical distinction between elements of a crime (which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt) and affirmative defenses (for which the burden can be shifted to the defendant), provided the defense does not alleviate the state's responsibility to prove the core elements. This ruling solidifies the legal landscape for such statutes, making future challenges to similar public safety laws, where the causal nexus might seem attenuated, considerably more difficult.
