State v. Gambrel
47 State Rptr. 2270, 246 Mont. 84, 803 P.2d 1071 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior violent acts against former intimate partners is admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish a common scheme, plan, or system of domestic violence, provided the acts meet the requirements of the Just test, especially when the probative value of such evidence is heightened by the absence of eyewitnesses to the charged crime.
Facts:
- On Christmas Eve 1984, after John Ed Gambrel, Jr. had been drinking, he tied his then-partner, Alane Shuster, to a bed against her will and inserted pieces of potato into her vagina.
- In the fall of 1986, Gambrel was living with Shelly Birky. On Christmas morning, she awoke to find him having intercourse with her, and when she resisted, he slammed her against walls, hit her, and repeatedly threatened to kill her.
- On Halloween 1987, Gambrel argued with his then-partner, Kathryn Jinx Kinslow, chasing her, slapping her, slashing her waterbed with a knife, and threatening to kill her.
- Gambrel later began a relationship with Lori Anne Schwegel and lived with her.
- On the evening of February 4, 1989, witnesses saw Gambrel intoxicated at various bars, appearing angry and stating that he planned to leave Schwegel.
- In the early morning of February 5, 1989, police found Schwegel dead in the apartment she shared with Gambrel, having been shot six times. Gambrel's rifle was beside her body.
- Gambrel arrived at the apartment minutes after police, suffering from two gunshot wounds to his head. He claimed an unknown third party had attacked both him and Schwegel.
- Medical experts testified that Gambrel's wounds were consistent with being self-inflicted and that he had no injuries consistent with his claim of being knocked unconscious.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged John Ed Gambrel, Jr. with deliberate homicide in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County.
- Before trial, the defense filed a motion in limine to prevent three of Gambrel's former partners from testifying about prior acts of violence.
- The trial court denied the motion in limine, ruling the testimony was admissible.
- At trial, a jury heard the testimony from the three women.
- The jury found Gambrel guilty of deliberate homicide.
- Gambrel's motion for a new trial, based on the same evidentiary arguments, was denied by the trial court.
- Gambrel, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Montana.
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Issue:
Does the admission of testimony from a defendant's former partners, detailing prior acts of physical abuse, sexual assault, and death threats, violate the rules of evidence when the defendant is on trial for the deliberate homicide of his current partner?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Turnage
No, the admission of the testimony does not violate the rules of evidence. Evidence of a defendant's prior wrongful acts is admissible if it satisfies the four-part test from State v. Just, which requires that the acts be similar, not too remote in time, tend to establish a common scheme, and have a probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant. The court found sufficient similarity in the pattern of unprovoked violence directed at intimate partners after Gambrel had been drinking. The acts, occurring two to four years prior, were not too remote given the continuing pattern. Together, they established a common system of violence against his partners. Crucially, in a deliberate homicide case with no eyewitnesses, the probative value of this evidence to rebut the defendant's 'unknown attacker' theory and establish a pattern of behavior outweighed its prejudicial effect.
Dissenting - Justice McDonough
Yes, the admission of the testimony violates the rules of evidence because its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. The testimony, particularly the details of the 'sexually perverted attack' on Alane Shuster and the rape of Shelly Birky, was so inflammatory that it guaranteed the jury would convict Gambrel based on his loathsome character rather than on the evidence specific to the charged homicide. This violates the fundamental principle of Rule 404(b) that a defendant should not be tried for being a 'bad man.' The court should have, at minimum, limited the details of the testimony to lessen the extreme prejudice.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the 'common scheme or plan' prong of the Just test in Montana, especially within the context of domestic violence. It establishes that a pattern of violence against sequential intimate partners can constitute a 'common scheme,' even if the specific acts (e.g., sexual assault, battery, homicide) differ. The ruling gives prosecutors a powerful tool in homicide cases lacking direct evidence, allowing them to introduce a defendant's history of domestic abuse to prove identity and intent. The case lowers the bar for similarity and heightens the probative value of prior acts evidence when circumstantial evidence is key to the prosecution's case.
