State v. Galvan
297 N.W.2d 344, 1980 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 952 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
For an out-of-court statement or assertive act to be admissible under the res gestae (excited utterance) exception to the hearsay rule, it must be so close in time to the transaction as to exclude any presumption of fabrication; an act occurring five months after the event is too remote.
Facts:
- On the evening of October 5, 1977, Galvan received a phone call from Phillip Cuevas.
- Galvan told his wife, Jenny Perez, that he was going to pick up Phillip and Mary Cuevas, and he left with his two-year-old daughter.
- Galvan returned approximately 45 minutes later with the Cuevases, who immediately went to the bathroom.
- Perez observed blood spots in the lavatory after the Cuevases used it, and she provided Mary Cuevas with a clean pair of pants.
- The Cuevases put clothing in a paper sack, placed it outside, and put lighter fluid on it before leaving in a car that belonged to the murder victim, William Turk.
- Two days later, Perez observed her two-year-old daughter take a belt, bind her own hands with it, and make gestures as if beating her own chest.
- Approximately five months after the murder, the same daughter began to cry after seeing a television cartoon in which a mouse was shown tied up.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Iowa prosecuted Galvan for first-degree murder in a state trial court.
- At trial, the court admitted testimony from Galvan's ex-wife about two instances of their daughter's conduct, over the defense's hearsay objections.
- A jury convicted Galvan of first-degree murder.
- Galvan appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Iowa, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony about his daughter's conduct.
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Issue:
Does a witness's testimony describing a child's assertive conduct, which occurred five months after a crime, fall within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Harris, Justice
No. A child's assertive conduct occurring five months after the event it purportedly describes is not so close to the transaction as to exclude any presumption of fabrication and therefore does not fall within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The court first determined that nonverbal assertive conduct, when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, constitutes hearsay. It then applied the two-part test for the res gestae exception: (1) spontaneity and (2) temporal proximity sufficient to exclude the presumption of fabrication. While the child's first act two days after the crime met both prongs, the second act five months later failed the temporal proximity prong. The court found this second act was too remote from the event to be considered reliable. Because the case against Galvan was circumstantial, the erroneous admission of this prejudicial evidence, which was intended to place him at the scene of the crime, required a reversal of the conviction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the temporal proximity requirement for the res gestae (or excited utterance) exception to the hearsay rule. It establishes a clear boundary, demonstrating that while courts have discretion, an event occurring months after the fact is too remote to qualify for the exception. The ruling reinforces that the passage of significant time undermines the core rationale of the exception—that the statement or act is reliable because the declarant had no time to fabricate. This precedent is crucial for evaluating the admissibility of evidence from child declarants, where the risk of intervening influence or misremembering increases substantially over time.
