State v. Freeman
450 N.W.2d 826 (1990)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant can be convicted of delivering a simulated controlled substance if they knowingly represent a substance to be a controlled substance, even if the defendant mistakenly believes they are delivering an actual controlled substance.
Facts:
- Robert Eric Freeman agreed to sell cocaine to Keith Hatcher.
- Hatcher was cooperating with the government as an informant.
- Hatcher gave Freeman $200 in exchange for a substance.
- Freeman delivered approximately two grams of a substance to Hatcher, representing it to be cocaine.
- Freeman believed the substance he was delivering was actual cocaine.
- Laboratory testing revealed the substance was acetaminophen, which is not a controlled substance.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Eric Freeman was charged in an Iowa trial court with delivering a simulated controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 204.401(2)(a).
- Following a bench trial, the trial court found Freeman guilty as charged.
- Freeman (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Iowa, arguing the State of Iowa (appellee) failed to prove he had the necessary criminal intent.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a defendant's mistaken belief that they are delivering an actual controlled substance, when they are in fact delivering a non-controlled substance, negate the criminal intent required for a conviction of delivering a simulated controlled substance?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice McGiverin
No. A defendant's mistaken belief that they are delivering an actual controlled substance does not negate the criminal intent required for conviction. The statute prohibiting the delivery of a simulated controlled substance requires only a knowing representation that a substance is a controlled substance, not a knowing misrepresentation. The core of the offense is engaging in conduct that appears to be part of the narcotics trade. The defense of mistake of fact is unavailable because the defense only applies if the defendant's conduct would have been innocent had the facts been as they believed them to be. In this case, had the substance been real cocaine as Freeman believed, he would have been guilty of the more serious offense of delivering a controlled substance.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the mens rea (criminal intent) for delivering a simulated controlled substance attaches to the representation, not to the nature of the substance itself. The court broadens the statute's application to punish the act of participating in the drug trade, regardless of the defendant's success in actually delivering an illicit substance. This prevents defendants from using their intent to commit a more serious crime as a defense against a lesser included one, reinforcing the legislative policy of deterring all forms of drug trafficking.
Unlock the full brief for State v. Freeman