State v. Fredenburg
1983 La. App. LEXIS 9763, 441 So.2d 443 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant who takes a substantial step toward the commission of a crime with the requisite specific intent is guilty of an attempt, and a subsequent voluntary abandonment of the criminal enterprise is not a defense to the charge of attempt.
Facts:
- On September 24, 1981, Ross Fredenburg entered a dry cleaning establishment with a hunting knife in his back pocket.
- Fredenburg approached the attendant, Mrs. Dell Spinks, announced that it was a robbery, and partially withdrew the knife.
- He ordered Mrs. Spinks to place all the money from the cash register into a paper bag, threatening to kill her if she failed to comply.
- When Mrs. Spinks attempted to hand the money directly to Fredenburg, he refused to take it.
- Fredenburg then instructed Mrs. Spinks to return the money to the cash register and call the police.
- Fredenburg took the phone from Mrs. Spinks and spoke with the police operator until an officer arrived to arrest him.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Ross Fredenburg with attempted second degree murder and attempted armed robbery.
- Following the appointment of a sanity commission, Fredenburg was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a forensic facility.
- After being deemed mentally competent, Fredenburg was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
- Fredenburg waived his right to a jury trial.
- Following a bench trial, the trial court acquitted Fredenburg of attempted second degree murder but found him guilty of attempted armed robbery.
- The trial court sentenced Fredenburg to 10 years imprisonment at hard labor.
- Fredenburg, as the appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a defendant who threatens a victim with a weapon and demands money, but then refuses the money and asks the victim to call the police, lack the specific intent required for a conviction of attempted armed robbery?
Opinions:
Majority - Jones, J.
No. A defendant's subsequent abandonment of a robbery does not negate the specific intent required for an attempt conviction once the defendant has already committed acts that constitute a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Specific intent is a subjective state of mind that can be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions. Fredenburg's acts of announcing a robbery, brandishing a knife, and demanding money demonstrated that, at that moment, he actively desired the criminal consequence of taking the money. Citing the legal principle that abandonment is not a defense to a completed attempt, the court reasoned that the offense of attempted armed robbery was complete when Fredenburg threatened Mrs. Spinks and demanded the money. His subsequent change of mind and refusal of the money only prevented the attempt from becoming a completed crime; it did not erase the crime of attempt that had already occurred. The defendant's motive, such as a 'cry for help,' is legally distinct from the specific intent to commit the criminal act itself.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal principle that the crime of attempt is complete once the defendant has taken a substantial step toward the offense with the required criminal intent. It clarifies that a subsequent change of heart or abandonment does not function as a defense to the attempt charge itself. The case emphasizes the distinction between a defendant's underlying motive and their specific intent at the moment the criminal act is undertaken, establishing that the latter is what the law focuses on for an attempt conviction. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to argue that their ultimate abandonment of a crime proves they never had the requisite intent in the first place.
