State v. Franklin
1985 W. Va. LEXIS 494, 174 W. Va. 469, 327 S.E.2d 449 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The persistent presence of organized, identifiable spectator groups prominently displaying symbols of an advocacy organization (such as MADD) throughout a criminal trial, particularly when accompanied by the visible partisan support of a law enforcement official, can create an atmosphere of pressure or prejudice that constitutes irreparable damage to a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, requiring reversal.
Facts:
- On March 5, 1982, Larry Dale Franklin drove a 1969 Ford pickup truck that collided with a Chevrolet Chevette driven by Roger Moss, resulting in Moss's death from massive head injuries.
- Richard Barnhart, Franklin's companion, testified that both had consumed over a six-pack of beer and Barnhart asked Franklin to drive because he felt 'tipsy.'
- Evidence suggested Franklin, driving eastbound, collided with Moss's westbound vehicle on or near the center lane, with damage indicating Franklin was considerably to the left of his side of the road.
- Trooper Glen F. Macher, Jr. observed Franklin at the hospital exhibiting flushed skin, mumbled and slurred speech, a 'mush-mouthed' appearance, and a 'moderate' smell of alcohol on his breath.
- Franklin signed a consent form for venipuncture, and a hospital technician extracted his blood, which later tested at .17 percent alcohol by weight, indicating he was legally drunk.
- During Franklin's three-day trial, between ten and thirty members of 'Mothers Against Drunk Drivers' (MADD), led by Sheriff Kisner, sat directly in front of the jury, prominently displaying large, bright yellow MADD lapel buttons.
- During jury selection, a potential juror was given a MADD button by Sheriff Kisner and instructed where to sit, leading to her immediate dismissal and the sheriff's censure by the court.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Dale Franklin was indicted by the grand jury of Berkeley County on May 18, 1982, for the felony charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, resulting in death.
- Franklin filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test, which the circuit court denied.
- The jury in the Circuit Court of Berkeley County found Franklin guilty and he was sentenced to 1-3 years, fined, and required to pay court costs.
- Franklin repeatedly requested a mistrial or the removal of MADD buttons and spectators from the courtroom due to their presence, which the circuit court denied.
- Franklin filed a motion for a correction of sentence, which the circuit court denied.
- Franklin appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Issue:
Does the persistent presence of organized spectators prominently displaying advocacy symbols (MADD buttons) throughout a criminal trial, coupled with the visible partisan activity of a law enforcement officer, violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, thereby warranting a mistrial?
Opinions:
Majority - Neely, Chief Justice
Yes, the persistent presence of organized spectators prominently displaying advocacy symbols, accompanied by the visible partisan activity of a law enforcement officer, violates a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The court reversed the circuit court's holding, finding that the MADD spectators' activities constituted reversible error. While acknowledging the constitutional mandate for open public trials, the court emphasized the need to coordinate this right with a defendant's right to a fair trial, which includes insulating the jury from pressure or prejudice. Distinguishing from State v. Richey, where the court found no irreparable damage from general public or victim's social group attendance, this case involved spectators who were 'clearly distinguishable from other visitors' and, 'led by the sheriff, they constituted a formidable, albeit passive, influence on the jury.' The court concluded that 'the mere presence of the spectators wearing MADD buttons and the pressure and activities of the uniformed sheriff leading them did do irreparable damage to the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.' The court also addressed other assignments of error: (1) The warrantless arrest for DUI resulting in death was lawful, even though the offense was not committed in the officer's presence, given Trooper Macher's reasonable grounds to believe Franklin committed a felony and the situation where the suspect was taken to the hospital from the accident scene, as envisaged by State v. Byers. (2) Franklin's signing of the consent form for blood extraction constituted voluntary consent, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to non-testimonial physical evidence like blood samples, as held in Holt v. United States and State v. Blaney. (3) The blood alcohol test results were admissible because the state laid a proper foundation, with the chemist testifying that the testing device was in proper working order, he was qualified, the test was properly conducted, and the method was approved by the Department of Health, satisfying the requirements set forth in State v. Hood and State v. Dyer. (4) The circuit court erred in denying probation eligibility, as clarified by State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, which held that probation is an authorized sentencing alternative for DUI resulting in death under W.Va.Code § 17C-5-2 when statutory conditions and concomitant community service/work release are met.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle of juror impartiality and the judicial responsibility to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial from outside influence. It clarifies that while public trials are guaranteed, highly visible, organized advocacy by spectators, especially when facilitated by law enforcement, can cross the line into impermissible prejudice, requiring a mistrial. Future cases will likely scrutinize courtroom spectator conduct more closely, particularly concerning organized groups expressing strong opinions, to ensure juries are not implicitly swayed by external pressures. This ruling provides a strong precedent for defendants challenging the impartiality of their trials based on spectator behavior.
