State v. Fortin
Citation not provided in text. (2020)
Rule of Law:
A defendant's unaccepted and unsigned offer to stipulate to certain facts, which is refused by the state, does not automatically obviate the state's need to prove identity through prior misconduct evidence or require the trial court to balance the offer against the prejudicial effect of such evidence under Old Chief v. United States. Additionally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial based on inadvertent, isolated, and immediately cured improper testimony by a witness.
Facts:
- On July 3, 2015, Michael Robert Fortin rode his motorcycle to Lakeside Drive in Andover to observe a fireworks display.
- John Totri and Jason Marchand (the victim), who lived on Lakeside Drive, approached Fortin and demanded that he move his motorcycle from a gravel right-of-way.
- Following a heated discussion, Fortin agreed to move his motorcycle, and as he "took off," small rocks were sprayed from the roadway toward Totri and Marchand.
- Approximately one hour later, Fortin returned to Lakeside Drive, approached Marchand's yard with his helmet on and a loaded, chambered gun.
- After a brief physical altercation with Marchand, Fortin fired his gun into the ground, then fired two more shots, both of which hit and ultimately killed Marchand.
- On the day after the shooting, Fortin, with the assistance of his girlfriend Carli Fandacone, disposed of his gun by throwing it into a swamp and pushed his motorcycle off a bridge into the Connecticut River.
- A subsequent investigation by Connecticut State Police Detective Jeffrey Payette into other firearm incidents in the Andover area ultimately led to Fortin's arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Connecticut filed a substitute information charging Michael Robert Fortin with murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and risk of injury to a child in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland.
- Fortin filed a motion in limine to preclude, among other things, evidence of four instances of misconduct relating to the firearm used in the shooting.
- At a hearing on this motion, the trial court (Graham, J.) denied it in part, allowing the state to present evidence of Fortin's prior use and possession of the firearm, but precluding evidence of the theft of the firearm itself and certain aspects of threatening.
- Separately, Fortin filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of him shooting his girlfriend with a flare gun, which the state conceded was inadmissible in its case-in-chief, and the trial court ruled that if the state sought to introduce it, it should raise the issue outside the jury's presence.
- During the trial, a state's witness, Dwayne Mitchell, inadvertently testified about Fortin shooting his girlfriend with a flare gun.
- Fortin immediately objected to Mitchell's testimony, and the trial court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to disregard it.
- At the conclusion of Mitchell's testimony, Fortin moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony was prejudicial.
- The trial court denied Fortin's motion for a mistrial.
- Following a jury trial, Fortin was found guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and of carrying a pistol without a permit, and his sentence was enhanced for using a firearm.
- The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-two years incarceration.
- Fortin appealed the judgment of conviction to the Connecticut Appellate Court.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's unaccepted and unsigned offer to stipulate that he shot the victim obviate the state's need to present prior misconduct evidence to prove identity, thereby requiring the trial court to exclude such evidence as unduly prejudicial under Old Chief v. United States?
Opinions:
Majority - Devlin, J.
No, a trial court does not improperly allow the state to introduce prior misconduct evidence to prove identity where the defendant's unaccepted and unsigned offer to stipulate to the shooting does not constitute a forthright judicial admission, and the Old Chief rule, which concerns proof of legal status rather than an element of the crime, does not apply. The court found that evidence of Fortin's uncharged misconduct (his prior uses of the same firearm) was indisputably probative of identity, an issue Fortin had contested. The general rule allows such evidence if it is relevant to an exception (like identity) and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Fortin's reliance on Old Chief v. United States (519 U.S. 172) was unavailing because Old Chief concerned a formal stipulation to a defendant's legal status (e.g., felon status for a gun possession charge), where specific details of the prior crime were unduly prejudicial. In contrast, Fortin's offer was an unsigned stipulation, not a "forthright concession" or judicial admission, and the state had to prove identity as a crucial factual element of the crime's narrative, not merely a legal status. The "standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice" applied here. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying Fortin's motion for a mistrial after a state's witness inadvertently mentioned a prior flare gun incident. This testimony was isolated, not invited by the state, and immediately cured by a clear instruction to the jury to disregard it. Juries are presumed to follow such instructions. Finally, the court concluded that Fortin's unpreserved Confrontation Clause claim failed under the fourth prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; Fortin did not object to the testimony regarding his lack of a pistol permit and even admitted during his own testimony that he was "illegally carrying" the gun, which independently supported his conviction on that charge.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the limited application of Old Chief v. United States in Connecticut jurisprudence, specifically distinguishing between a defendant's offer to stipulate to a legal status element versus a factual element like identity crucial to the narrative of the crime. It reaffirms the prosecution's right to present its chosen evidence to prove every element of its case unless a formal judicial admission is made. For criminal defense attorneys, it highlights the strategic importance of formal stipulations and the high bar for successfully arguing undue prejudice when identity is actively contested. The ruling also reinforces the deference appellate courts give to trial judges regarding curative instructions and motions for mistrial.
