State v. Forrest
168 N.C. App. 614, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 392, 609 S.E.2d 241 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
The North Carolina habitual misdemeanor assault statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2, does not require that the requisite five or more prior misdemeanor convictions, including two assaults, arise from separate incidents or occasions. Furthermore, a trial court has broad discretion to impose physical restraints on a criminal defendant when reasonably necessary to maintain order, prevent escape, or provide for safety, provided procedural safeguards are met.
Facts:
- On January 22, 2003, Willie Forrest, III (defendant) was present in a Wake County courtroom during the sentencing phase of his trial for an unrelated criminal matter.
- As the verdict was being read and during the Assistant District Attorney's address, Forrest became increasingly agitated, rolled his head in disgust, and balled his hand into a fist.
- Forrest then abruptly stood and struck his unsuspecting attorney, George Hughes, on the side of the head with his fist, rendering Hughes immediately unconscious and causing him to fall to the floor.
- Forrest continued to punch and kick Hughes, landing at least one more forceful blow, before being tackled by the Assistant District Attorney and four sheriff's deputies.
- During the scuffle, Forrest bit Lieutenant David Woodruff on the arm and attempted to bite Hughes as both men lay on the courtroom floor.
- Hughes sustained a fractured skull, was hospitalized overnight in the intensive care unit, and a neurosurgeon testified that a blow of that nature could result in death.
- In 1996, while incarcerated, Forrest had previously attacked another attorney, John Fenner, striking him in the head and knocking him to the floor, resulting in four misdemeanor convictions. Forrest also had a 2001 conviction for communicating threats.
Procedural Posture:
- On January 28, 2003, the Wake County Grand Jury returned four indictments charging Willie Forrest, III with attempted first degree murder, habitual misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury, habitual misdemeanor assault on a law enforcement officer, and being a habitual felon.
- These charges were joined and called for trial at the July 15, 2003 criminal session of Wake County Superior Court.
- During pretrial proceedings, Forrest objected to being physically restrained, but the trial court, after a hearing, ruled that restraints were "both necessary and appropriate for the security of court personnel."
- Forrest then made an oral motion to voluntarily waive his right to be present during the trial, which the trial court, after a hearing, denied.
- At the close of the State’s evidence, Forrest moved to dismiss all charges, including the two habitual misdemeanor assault charges and the attempted first-degree murder charge, which the trial court denied.
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Issue:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering defendant Willie Forrest, III, to be physically restrained during his trial and by denying his oral motion to waive his right to be present? 2. Does the North Carolina habitual misdemeanor assault statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2, require that the five or more prior misdemeanor convictions, including two assaults, arise from separate incidents or occasions?
Opinions:
Majority - Elmore, Judge
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant Willie Forrest, III, to be physically restrained and denying his oral motion to waive his right to be present at trial. Furthermore, the North Carolina habitual misdemeanor assault statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2, does not require that the five or more prior misdemeanor convictions, including two assaults, arise from separate incidents or occasions. Regarding the physical restraints, the court found the trial court's decision was supported by ample evidence demonstrating a reasonable necessity for security. Forrest was on trial for a brutal courtroom attack on his attorney and a deputy, had a prior history of assaulting another attorney, and displayed disruptive behavior (spitting, profane outbursts) during pretrial proceedings. The trial court complied with the procedural requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1031 and applied the factors enumerated in State v. Tolley by holding a hearing, making findings, stating reasons, and instructing the jury. For the waiver of presence, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1011(d) unambiguously requires a written waiver, and Forrest conceded he submitted none, thus failing to comply with the statutory mandate. Regarding the habitual misdemeanor assault charges, the court discerned no support for Forrest's proposed construction from the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2. The statute clearly lists the elements as a current assault and "five or more prior misdemeanor convictions, two of which were assaults," without any language requiring these convictions to occur on separate dates or arise from separate incidents. The court noted that if the legislature intended a "separate occurrences" requirement, it would have included it, as it did in the habitual felon statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1). Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss these charges. The court also rejected abandoned constitutional arguments regarding ex post facto and double jeopardy. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the attempted first-degree murder charge, finding substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation. This was inferred from the lack of provocation by Hughes, Forrest's agitation and subsequent change in expression, his explicit and violent statements during and immediately after the assault expressing intent to kill Hughes, the severity of the initial blow, and his continued assault on Hughes after he was rendered unconscious. These circumstances align with factors for premeditation and deliberation outlined in State v. Vause.
Analysis:
This case provides significant clarification on the interpretation of North Carolina's habitual misdemeanor assault statute, establishing that multiple prior convictions arising from a single incident can indeed count towards the statutory threshold. It reinforces the broad discretionary power of trial courts to ensure courtroom security through physical restraints, especially for defendants with a documented history of violence and disruptive behavior, provided that procedural safeguards are meticulously followed. The ruling also underscores the strict requirement for written documentation when waiving fundamental rights, such as the right to be present at trial. Furthermore, it serves as a strong illustration of how circumstantial evidence, particularly the defendant's conduct and statements surrounding an incident, can sufficiently establish premeditation and deliberation in attempted first-degree murder cases, even in seemingly spontaneous attacks.
