State v. Forbes
348 So.2d 983 (1977)
Rule of Law:
A trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a juror's unintentional misstatement during voir dire is reviewed for abuse of discretion, particularly if the juror clarifies the misunderstanding and maintains impartiality. A change of venue is not required due to pretrial publicity unless pervasive prejudice prevents the selection of a fair and impartial jury, and the dual sovereignty doctrine permits separate state and federal prosecutions for the same conduct.
Facts:
- James Jones, dressed in female clothing, and Joseph Forbes entered an Opelousas bank.
- Richard Jones remained in a car outside the bank.
- James Jones and Joseph Forbes ordered two bank tellers and a customer to lie on the floor face down at gunpoint.
- The two defendants tied and handcuffed the tellers and customer.
- James Jones and Joseph Forbes emptied the cash drawers.
- As they threw the money and a gun into the waiting car, police arrived and arrested all three defendants.
Procedural Posture:
- The State jointly charged Joseph B. Forbes, Sr., Richard Jones, and James A. Jones with armed robbery.
- A unanimous jury in the trial court found all three defendants guilty as charged.
- Each defendant received forty years imprisonment at hard labor.
- The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, raising five assignments of error and an additional pro se argument from Joseph Forbes.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial when a juror provides an inaccurate answer during voir dire regarding relatives in law enforcement, but subsequently clarifies that the inaccuracy was due to a misunderstanding and affirms their impartiality?
Opinions:
Majority - Sanders, Chief Justice
No, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial under such circumstances. Regarding a denied challenge for cause, a defendant cannot complain if they have not exhausted all peremptory challenges. In this case, Joseph Forbes used only eleven of his twelve challenges. Even if reviewed, the prospective juror Mr. Savoie was found willing and able to accept and apply the law. As for the juror's misstatement, Mr. Frilot testified that he misunderstood the question about relatives in law enforcement, believing it referred only to arresting officers in the specific case, not all law enforcement. He stated his mistake was unintentional and would not influence his decision, which would be based solely on trial evidence. A mistrial is a drastic remedy authorized only for unnecessary prejudice, and the trial judge has discretion in ruling on such motions. This Court will not disturb the ruling absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. The evidence supported Mr. Frilot's impartiality, thus the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. The court also held that photographs are admissible if accurately taken, are a correct representation, and shed light on the matter, even if not identified by the photographer, and that Officer Clay's identification of the car in the photos was sufficient. Furthermore, any error in admitting the photos was harmless given other photos of the same car were admitted. The admission of demonstrative evidence, such as boots, requires identification either visually or through a chain of custody, and it suffices if it's 'more probable than not' that the object is connected to the case. Here, Officer Clay visually identified the boots, and a sufficient chain of custody was established. Regarding the motion for a change of venue, defendants bear the burden of proving prejudice in the public mind preventing a fair trial, and extensive pretrial publicity alone is insufficient. Both a 'dry run' voir dire and the actual jury selection indicated that prospective jurors had only superficial knowledge and could set aside opinions, affirming their impartiality. Finally, the court confirmed that a prior conviction in federal court for bank robbery does not bar a subsequent state prosecution for armed robbery under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 597 and the dual sovereignty doctrine, which permits separate prosecutions by different sovereigns for the same act. The convictions and sentences are affirmed.
Concurring - Tate, J.
Concurs only in the result of the disposition of Assignment 2.
Dissenting - Calogero, Justice
Yes, the trial judge erred in failing to grant the defendant's requested mistrial. Mr. Frilot made a false statement on voir dire examination by denying relatives in law enforcement, despite having two sons who were officers. While Mr. Frilot claimed to have misunderstood the question, believing it referred only to persons involved in the instant trial, it is inconceivable that he could have genuinely misunderstood. The question regarding law enforcement connections was asked repeatedly to numerous panels of prospective jurors, many of whom were questioned extensively and excused for admitting such relationships. The extensive and repeated nature of the questioning, and the context of other jurors being excused for similar reasons, should have made the scope of the question clear to Mr. Frilot. Therefore, a mistrial should have been granted.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad discretion afforded to trial judges in managing jury selection, ruling on mistrial motions due to juror conduct, and admitting evidence. It establishes a high bar for overturning these decisions, requiring a clear showing of abuse of discretion, and emphasizes that unintentional misstatements by jurors do not automatically necessitate a mistrial if impartiality can be established. Furthermore, the ruling underscores that extensive pretrial publicity alone is insufficient for a change of venue, placing a heavy burden on defendants to prove actual pervasive prejudice in the community. The case also affirms the long-standing dual sovereignty doctrine, clarifying that state and federal governments may prosecute the same conduct independently.
