State v. Florant
602 So. 2d 338, 1992 WL 147354 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
For a simple robbery conviction in Louisiana, the State must prove that the taking of value from another was accomplished by use of force or intimidation beyond the physical effort of merely taking the item, requiring evidence of an increased risk of danger to human life or an overcoming of the victim's will or resistance, not merely subjective feelings of unease.
Facts:
- On June 30, 1989, Fred and Wendy Wittich, tourists from Minneapolis, were vacationing in the New Orleans French Quarter.
- Carl Florant approached Fred Wittich, who was smoking outside a shop, and persistently offered to shine his shoes, eventually proposing a bet that he could tell where Wittich's shoes came from if he could shine them, which Wittich, feeling scared, accepted.
- After Florant applied paste and buffed the shoes, Fred Wittich took out a twenty-dollar bill and asked if Florant had change.
- Carl Florant immediately grabbed the twenty-dollar bill from Fred Wittich's hand, laughed, declared, 'You been had. You been took in New Orleans,' and ran up the street into a crowd of his friends.
- Fred Wittich characterized his reactions to the incident as 'humiliated, foolish, defrauded and intimidated by the look in his eyes,' but Florant did not exhibit any weapons or engage in battery, assault, or physical contact.
- Mrs. Wittich had taken several photographs of Florant shining Mr. Wittich's shoes before the incident.
- Upon returning to Minneapolis, Mr. Wittich had his film developed, and the photographs clearly showed Florant, prompting Mr. Wittich to send them with a complaint letter to the New Orleans Police Department, which led to Florant's arrest by Officer Chad Stokes.
Procedural Posture:
- Carl Florant was charged by bill of information with simple robbery.
- On April 2, 1991, following a jury trial, Carl Florant was found guilty as charged in a state trial court.
- On April 5, 1991, Carl Florant pled guilty to a multiple bill filed by the State and was sentenced as a multiple offender to four years and eight months at hard labor.
- Carl Florant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, asserting that the State failed to prove simple robbery beyond a reasonable doubt and that his sentence was unconstitutionally excessive.
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Issue:
Does the act of a defendant snatching money from a victim's hand, accompanied by verbal taunts and the victim's subjective feeling of intimidation by a 'look in the eye,' constitute the 'use of force or intimidation' required for a conviction of simple robbery under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:65?
Opinions:
Majority - Plotkin, J.
No, the act of a defendant snatching money from a victim's hand, accompanied by verbal taunts and the victim's subjective feeling of intimidation by a 'look in the eye,' does not constitute the 'use of force or intimidation' required for a conviction of simple robbery under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:65. The court emphasized that the critical difference between simple robbery and theft is the 'force or intimidation' element, which the legislature intended to address an 'increased risk of danger to human life' when a theft is carried out in the face of the victim's opposition, as established in State v. Mason. The record in this case showed no such increased risk. Citing State v. LeBlanc, the court further clarified that 'use of force' in simple robbery requires 'some additional 'use of force' in overcoming the will or resistance of the victim' beyond the mere 'energy or physical effort' of taking the item. The court found no evidence that Florant expended physical effort or force to overcome Mr. Wittich's will or resistance. Regarding 'intimidation,' defined by Black's Law Dictionary as 'unlawful coercion; duress; putting in fear,' the court held that Mr. Wittich's subjective feelings of being 'humiliated, foolish, defrauded, and intimidated by the look in his eyes' were insufficient to establish this element beyond a reasonable doubt, explicitly declining to accept the argument that a person can be intimidated by 'the look in the eye.' The court concluded that while Florant cheated and defrauded Mr. Wittich, he did not commit simple robbery, suggesting the appropriate charge would be theft.
Dissenting - Lobrano, J.
Yes, a rational juror could conclude the victim was intimidated, which is sufficient to support a conviction for simple robbery, as the statute requires force or intimidation, not both. The dissent argued that the majority overlooked evidence of intimidation and improperly usurped the jury's factual determination. Mr. Wittich testified that he felt intimidated by Florant's demeanor and did not pursue him after the money was grabbed because he had recently undergone back surgery and 'was in no condition to chase anybody or anything,' and felt it would be unwise to confront Florant and his group of friends. The dissent contended that, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find intimidation.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between simple robbery and theft in Louisiana, particularly concerning the 'force or intimidation' element. It establishes that this element requires more than a mere 'snatching' or a victim's subjective feeling of unease; there must be evidence of actual force to overcome resistance, an increased risk of danger, or an objective act of coercion or threat. The ruling limits the scope of 'intimidation' by rejecting subjective interpretations like a 'look in the eye,' demanding concrete actions that put a victim in fear. This decision provides a crucial precedent for prosecutors and defense attorneys in differentiating between property crimes, impacting charging decisions and the elements of proof required for serious offenses.
