State v. Fell
210 Ariz. 554, 115 P.3d 594, 456 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 18 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not require a jury to find aggravating facts before a judge imposes a sentence within a statutory range authorized solely by the jury's guilty verdict. Additionally, a new law that substantively alters the factors a court can consider in sentencing cannot be applied retroactively to crimes committed before its enactment unless the legislature expressly declares it so.
Facts:
- In 2000, Edward John Sanders committed a murder and sexual assault.
- The victim of the murder was seventy years of age or older.
- At the time of the crime, Arizona's first-degree murder statute, A.R.S. § 13-703(A), provided for sentences of either life with the possibility of release after 25 years or natural life without any possibility of release.
- The governing statute gave the sentencing judge discretion to choose between a life and a natural life sentence without requiring any additional factual findings beyond the jury's guilty verdict.
- In 2003, after Sanders committed the crime, the Arizona legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-703.01(Q), which changed the list of aggravating and mitigating factors a judge must consider when choosing between a life and natural life sentence.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward John Sanders was indicted for murder and sexual assault.
- The State initially filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty but later withdrew it.
- On June 11, 2004, a jury in the superior court (trial court) found Sanders guilty of first-degree murder.
- The trial judge determined that under Blakely v. Washington, a jury was required to find aggravating circumstances before a natural life sentence could be imposed.
- The State filed a petition for special action in the court of appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the trial court, holding that Blakely did not apply to Arizona's non-capital first-degree murder sentencing scheme.
- Sanders, as petitioner, sought review of the Blakely holding in the Arizona Supreme Court, and the State, as cross-petitioner, sought review of the court's holding on retroactivity.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Blakely v. Washington, require a jury to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance before a judge can impose a sentence of natural life instead of life with the possibility of release for a first-degree murder conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Hurwitz, Justice.
No. The Sixth Amendment is not violated when a judge imposes a natural life sentence without jury-found aggravating facts because, under Arizona's statutory scheme, natural life is not beyond the 'statutory maximum' authorized by the jury's guilty verdict alone. The relevant statutory maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose without any additional findings beyond the verdict. Here, the first-degree murder statute established a sentencing range from life with parole eligibility to natural life. A guilty verdict for first-degree murder exposed the defendant to the entire range, and the judge's choice within that range is a discretionary act, not a factual finding that increases the maximum penalty. Unlike determinate sentencing schemes with a presumptive term that can only be exceeded upon finding an aggravator, this statute created an indeterminate range, and the judge's fact-finding only guided discretion within that pre-authorized range. The court also held that the 2003 statutory amendment, which expanded the list of sentencing factors, was a substantive change and could not be applied retroactively to Sanders' 2000 crime.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the Apprendi/Blakely line of cases to indeterminate sentencing schemes. It establishes a critical distinction between judicial fact-finding that unconstitutionally increases a sentence beyond the statutory maximum and permissible judicial fact-finding that guides discretion within a statutorily authorized range. The ruling confirms that if a jury's verdict alone authorizes a range of sentences (e.g., 25 years to life), a judge's subsequent findings to select a specific sentence within that range do not infringe on the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. This holding provides a clear boundary for states, allowing them to maintain sentencing schemes that grant judges discretion so long as that discretion does not extend beyond the maximum penalty authorized by the facts found by the jury.
