State v. Etzweiler
125 N.H. 57 (1984)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under New Hampshire's Criminal Code, a person cannot be held criminally liable for negligent homicide, either directly or as an accomplice, for lending their car to an intoxicated person when they are not present during the subsequent fatal accident. One cannot be an accomplice to negligent homicide because it is impossible to have the required "purpose" to facilitate an offense that the principal, by definition, is unaware they are committing.
Facts:
- Ralph Bailey had been drinking alcoholic beverages and was allegedly intoxicated.
- Mark Etzweiler arrived at the plant where both men were employed in Etzweiler's automobile with Bailey.
- Etzweiler, allegedly knowing that Bailey was intoxicated, loaned his car to Bailey.
- Etzweiler then proceeded into the plant to begin work, while Bailey drove Etzweiler’s car away alone.
- Approximately ten minutes later, Bailey, while driving recklessly, collided with a car driven by Susan Beaulieu.
- As a result of the collision, two passengers in the Beaulieu car, Kathryn and Nathan Beaulieu, were killed.
Procedural Posture:
- The grand jury indicted Mark Etzweiler on two counts of negligent homicide.
- The grand jury also indicted Ralph Bailey on two counts of manslaughter.
- Subsequently, the grand jury issued two additional indictments charging Etzweiler with negligent homicide as an accomplice.
- In the Superior Court, Etzweiler filed motions to quash all indictments against him.
- The Superior Court transferred the questions of law raised by Etzweiler's motions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
- The Superior Court denied Bailey’s motion to dismiss the manslaughter indictments against him.
- The Superior Court then granted Bailey’s motion for an interlocutory appeal.
- The New Hampshire Supreme Court, the highest court in the state, consolidated the cases for its review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does New Hampshire's negligent homicide statute or accomplice liability statute impose criminal liability on a person who, knowing a driver is intoxicated, lends their car to that driver but does not accompany them, when the driver's subsequent operation of the car causes death?
Opinions:
Majority - Batchelder, J.
No. The legislature did not intend to impose criminal liability under the negligent homicide or accomplice liability statutes in this situation. For direct liability, imposing criminal liability for negligent entrustment resulting in death is a significant policy decision that should be made by the legislature, not through judicial innovation. For accomplice liability, the statute requires that the accomplice act with the 'purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.' The substantive offense here is negligent homicide, which requires the principal (Bailey) to be unaware of the risk of death his conduct creates. It is logically impossible for a person (Etzweiler) to intentionally aid or have the purpose to facilitate a crime that the principal is, by definition of the crime itself, unaware he is committing.
Dissenting - King, C.J.
Yes. The indictments against Etzweiler should be upheld. The central question of whether lending a car to an intoxicated driver creates a foreseeable risk of a fatal accident is a question of fact for a jury to decide, not a matter of law for the court to dismiss. The existing negligent homicide statute, which penalizes conduct constituting a 'gross deviation' from what a reasonable person would observe, already contemplates Etzweiler's actions. Furthermore, under a proper reading of the accomplice liability statute (RSA 626:8, IV), a person can be an accomplice if they act purposefully with respect to the principal's criminal conduct (driving while intoxicated) and negligently with respect to the criminal result (the deaths).
Concurring - Souter, J.
No. While agreeing with the majority's result, the reasoning differs. The section of the accomplice liability statute that the dissent relies on (RSA 626:8, IV) is incomprehensibly vague and thus unenforceable as it fails to give fair notice of its intended effect. Therefore, the accomplice indictments must fail. The indictments against Etzweiler were properly dismissed.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Douglas, J.
Yes, in part. Agreeing with Part I of Chief Justice King's dissent, the indictments against Etzweiler as a principal for negligent homicide should not have been quashed. The question of whether his conduct was a legal cause of the deaths is a matter for a jury to determine based on foreseeability.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant limitation on accomplice liability in New Hampshire, holding that one cannot have the requisite 'purpose' to aid a crime of negligence. The decision highlights the judicial tension between interpreting existing statutes broadly and deferring to the legislature on major public policy questions, especially in the context of criminal law. By refusing to extend criminal liability for 'negligent entrustment' to homicide without explicit legislative direction, the court affirmed a strict constructionist approach and set a precedent that protects individuals from accomplice liability for unintentional crimes committed by others.
Unlock the full brief for State v. Etzweiler