State v. Espiritu
2008 Haw. LEXIS 15, 117 Haw. 127, 176 P.3d 885 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Prosecutorial misstatements of law during closing arguments, particularly concerning the elements of an affirmative defense, constitute harmful error requiring a new trial if they are not specifically corrected by the court and there is a reasonable possibility they contributed to the conviction.
Facts:
- In June or July 2001, Christopher Espirita (Petitioner) and the Complainant began a dating or sexual relationship that lasted approximately two months, after which they remained in contact.
- Between November 29 and December 4, 2002, Espirita allegedly sent the Complainant four threatening text messages.
- On December 4, 2002, after finishing work, the Complainant met Derek Liburd at a bar and later went to her home where they had sex.
- While the Complainant and Liburd were in her bedroom, a motion detector light went off outside, and shortly after, Espirita appeared at the bottom of her stairs outside the bedroom with a gun.
- Liburd struggled with Espirita, then ran upstairs; Espirita then held the gun next to the left cheek of the Complainant's face, told her “you are going to die tonight” and “we’re both going to die,” and then shot her.
- At the time of trial, the Complainant no longer possessed the cell phone with the original text messages because she had discontinued her service and changed providers.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Hawai'i charged Christopher Espirita with attempted murder in the second degree (Count 1), carrying or use of a firearm in the commission of a separate felony (Count 2), and place to keep firearm (Count 3).
- The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, acting as the trial court, convicted Espirita on all three counts and sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment with possibility of parole on Count 1, twenty years on Count 2, and ten years on Count 3.
- Espirita appealed his conviction to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), where he was the appellant and the State of Hawai'i was the appellee.
- The ICA affirmed the circuit court's judgment via a Summary Disposition Order.
- Espirita filed an application for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, seeking review of the ICA's judgment, where he was the petitioner/defendant-appellant and the State of Hawai'i was the respondent/plaintiff-appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a prosecutor's closing argument that misstates the legal requirements for an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED) defense, when defense objections are overruled and no specific curative instruction is given by the court, constitute harmful error warranting a new trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Acoba, J.
Yes, a prosecutor's closing argument that misstates the legal requirements for an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED) defense, when defense objections are overruled and no specific curative instruction is provided by the court, constitutes harmful error that requires a new trial. The court first affirmed that the Complainant's testimony about the text messages was admissible. Despite the original cell phone being unavailable, the messages qualified under Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 1004 as originals lost or destroyed without bad faith. Additionally, the Complainant's memory was sufficiently refreshed by a police report regarding the messages under HRE Rule 612. The court did not rule on the demonstrative evidence involving Dr. Manoukian due to an unclear trial record. However, the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments repeatedly misstated the law regarding the EMED defense by suggesting that a "special relationship" between the defendant and victim and an "immediacy" of violent reaction to a triggering event were necessary requirements for the defense. These are not elements of the EMED defense under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-702. Defense counsel's objections to these misstatements were overruled, and the trial court failed to provide specific curative instructions to the jury. While general instructions that attorney arguments are not evidence were given, they were deemed insufficient to correct these specific misstatements of law, which the jury would reasonably perceive as correct due to the overruled objections. The court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it directly bore on Espirita’s EMED defense, creating a reasonable possibility that it contributed to his conviction for attempted murder instead of attempted EMED manslaughter. The majority distinguished State v. Kupihea by noting that the prosecutor's misrepresentations in the current case were more egregious, repeated, and distorted the universal applicability of the law, unlike the hypothetical in Kupihea.
Dissenting - Nakayama, J.
No, the prosecutor's closing argument did not constitute harmful error requiring a new trial, because the prosecutor's statements were invited by the defense counsel's closing arguments, and the jury received general instructions that attorneys' arguments are not evidence. Justice Nakayama argued that the prosecutor's rebuttal was a legitimate response to defense counsel's closing argument, which had repeatedly emphasized the "intimate relationship" between Espirita and the Complainant and framed the shooting as a "hot blood crime of passion" where Espirita "lost it" upon seeing the Complainant with Liburd. The prosecutor's "special relationship" and "immediacy" arguments, including the father/son hypothetical, were therefore invited by the defense to highlight inconsistencies in their argument regarding the reasonableness of Espirita's actions. The dissent contended that the trial court's general instructions to the jury—that attorney arguments are not evidence and that the jury should apply its common sense—were sufficient to prevent prejudice. Overruling defense objections by stating "Counsel, it is argument" was consistent with these instructions. Justice Nakayama also distinguished Kupihea differently, asserting that it did not impose a requirement on prosecutors to explicitly state that conditions mentioned in a hypothetical are not necessary elements of a defense, and that the context of the prosecutor's statements in this case prevented substantial prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Analysis:
This case underscores the critical importance of accurate legal instruction to the jury, particularly when an affirmative defense like extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED) is at issue. It clarifies that prosecutorial misstatements of law, even within the context of argument, can be reversible error if not specifically cured by the court. The ruling reinforces that general jury instructions (e.g., arguments are not evidence) are often insufficient to overcome specific legal misrepresentations, especially when objections are overruled, lending apparent judicial approval to the misstatements. This impacts future cases by requiring courts to be more vigilant in correcting prosecutorial misstatements of law and by potentially giving defense counsel stronger grounds for appeal when such errors occur and are not remedied.
