State v. Edwards
787 So.2d 981, 2001 WL 587484 (2001)
Rule of Law:
The mandatory forfeiture of a vehicle upon conviction of a third DWI offense under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:98(D)(2)(a) is a constitutional criminal forfeiture, deemed a reasonable exercise of police power and a statutory restriction on property rights, and does not violate Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution.
Facts:
- On April 12, 1998, Norman Edwards was involved in a three-vehicle accident in East Baton Rouge Parish.
- Edwards told the state trooper investigating the accident that he was not paying attention and had hit the rear of the vehicle preceding him.
- During his conversation with Edwards, the trooper smelled alcohol and conducted a field sobriety test, which showed additional signs of intoxication.
- Edwards was transported to a police station where he registered .114 on the intoxilyzer machine.
- Edwards had two previous DWI convictions: one on January 14, 1998, in Baton Rouge City Court (first offense), and another on April 13, 1998, in Denham Springs City Court (second offense).
Procedural Posture:
- On May 13, 1998, Norman Edwards was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, in the 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge.
- On November 20, 1998, Edwards filed a Motion to Rule the Vehicle Forfeiture Provision Unconstitutional.
- On February 1, 1999, Edwards pled guilty to the charge, reserving his right to challenge the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision (La. R.S. 14:98(D)).
- The trial court (19th Judicial District Court) accepted Edwards' guilty plea, heard arguments on the forfeiture issue, and subsequently ruled that the statute was constitutional.
- The trial court sentenced Edwards, including the forfeiture of his vehicle.
- Edwards moved for an appeal of the trial court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision.
- The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, determining that the statute was constitutional under both the United States and Louisiana constitutions.
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Issue:
Does Louisiana Revised Statute 14:98(D)(2)(a), which mandates the forfeiture of a vehicle upon conviction of a third DWI offense, violate Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, given its prohibition against taking personal effects unless related to contraband drugs?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, J.
Yes, Louisiana Revised Statute 14:98(D)(2)(a), which mandates vehicle forfeiture for a third DWI offense, is constitutional and does not violate Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution. The court first determined that the seizure and impoundment of Edwards' automobile were lawful, as they were incidental to a lawful arrest and occurred after a conviction, thereby satisfying Fourth Amendment and Louisiana Article I, Section 5 due process requirements; the owner also has sufficient opportunity to challenge erroneous seizures. The court clarified that the 1989 amendment to Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, which primarily addressed civil forfeiture of drug-related property, does not restrict the legislature's power to implement criminal forfeitures for other offenses. La. R.S. 14:98(D) is considered a criminal forfeiture, part of the sentencing scheme and a reasonable exercise of the state's police power under the first paragraph of Article I, Section 4, rather than a civil forfeiture governed by the third paragraph. The state has significant interests in deterring repeat DWI offenses, reducing traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries, which justify depriving a convicted third-offense DWI offender of their vehicle. Furthermore, the statute includes safeguards for innocent owners, and the operation of a motor vehicle is a privilege granted by the state, subject to reasonable conditions. Therefore, the statute is a reasonable statutory restriction and a legitimate exercise of police power that meets constitutional mandates.
Dissenting - Calogero, C.J.
No, Louisiana Revised Statute 14:98(D)(2)(a), which mandates the forfeiture of a vehicle upon conviction of a third DWI offense, is unconstitutional because it violates the absolute prohibition against taking 'personal effects' in the amended Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, except for the specifically enumerated drug-related property. Chief Justice Calogero argued that the 1989 amendment to Article I, Section 4 explicitly states, 'Personal effects shall never be taken,' and provides only a narrow exception for contraband drugs and related property, which is to be handled in civil proceedings. Since an automobile is a personal effect and Edwards' offense did not involve contraband drugs, the statute directly conflicts with the clear constitutional prohibition. While acknowledging the importance of deterring intoxicated drivers, the dissent asserted that upholding such a statute effectively amounts to a de facto judicial amendment of the constitution, rather than requiring the proper procedure of a constitutional amendment to allow for the state to take property under these circumstances.
Concurring - Knoll, J.
Justice Knoll concurred with the majority's decision.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between criminal and civil forfeitures under the Louisiana Constitution, especially in light of the 1989 amendment to Article I, Section 4. The ruling broadens the state's power to implement punitive forfeitures for non-drug-related offenses as a valid exercise of police power, affirming legislative discretion in public safety matters. It establishes that while the constitution limits civil forfeitures to specific drug-related property, it does not similarly restrict criminal forfeitures. This interpretation could pave the way for other criminal forfeiture statutes for various offenses, provided they are deemed a reasonable exercise of police power and adhere to due process requirements, thereby expanding the tools available to the state for crime deterrence and punishment.
