State v. Edmunds
2008 WI App 33, 308 Wis. 2d 374, 746 N.W.2d 590 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
When evaluating a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, if both the new and old evidence are credible, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that a jury, considering all the evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, rather than weighing the competing evidence to determine which is 'stronger' or 'more convincing.'
Facts:
- On October 16, 1995, seven-month-old Natalie died while in Audrey Edmunds's care at Edmunds's home.
- Natalie's mother and the father of another child observed Natalie acting normally when she was dropped off at Edmunds's home on the morning of her death.
- Edmunds testified that after Natalie was dropped off, Natalie cried very hard and refused her bottle; later, Edmunds found Natalie limp with liquid coming from her nose and mouth and called 911.
- At the time of Edmunds's original trial, prevailing medical opinion, as presented by the State's experts, attributed Natalie's death to violent shaking or shaking combined with impact, asserting this would cause immediate and obvious symptoms.
- Edmunds's medical expert at trial offered a minority opinion that the injury occurred before Natalie was brought to Edmunds's home, followed by a lucid interval before a seizure.
- Over the ten years following Edmunds's conviction, a significant and legitimate debate emerged in the medical community regarding 'shaken baby syndrome,' including whether fatal injuries can result from shaking alone, the possibility of significant lucid intervals after head trauma, and whether other causes can mimic symptoms traditionally linked to shaken baby or shaken impact syndrome.
Procedural Posture:
- Audrey Edmunds was charged with first-degree reckless homicide and subsequently convicted in the circuit court.
- Edmunds filed a postconviction motion in the circuit court in 1997, arguing insufficiency of evidence, trial errors, sentencing errors, and claiming entitlement to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which the circuit court denied.
- Edmunds appealed the circuit court's denial of her 1997 postconviction motion to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (appellant), which affirmed the circuit court's decision (appellee).
- Edmunds filed a second motion for a new trial in the circuit court in 2006, asserting that significant developments in the medical community since her trial amounted to newly discovered evidence.
- The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, found that Edmunds had presented newly discovered evidence that met the first four criteria, but denied her motion because it concluded she had not established a reasonable probability of a different result with the new evidence, finding the State's evidence more convincing.
- Edmunds appealed the circuit court's denial of her 2006 motion to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (appellant).
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Issue:
Does a circuit court apply the correct legal standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when it weighs competing credible medical expert testimony to determine which is 'more convincing,' instead of determining if there is a reasonable probability a jury would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt?
Opinions:
Majority - Dykman, J.
Yes, a circuit court applies an erroneous legal standard when it weighs competing credible medical expert testimony to determine which is 'more convincing' instead of determining if there is a reasonable probability a jury would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. The court concluded that Edmunds's claims were not procedurally barred under Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) because the newly discovered medical evidence was entirely different in character from what was offered in her prior 1997 postconviction motion; the 'fringe views' of 1997 had evolved into a 'legitimate and significant debate' in the medical community over the decade. The court affirmed the circuit court's finding that Edmunds satisfied the first four criteria for newly discovered evidence (discovered after conviction, no negligence, material, not merely cumulative). However, the circuit court erred in applying the fifth criterion, 'whether a reasonable probability exists that a different result would be reached in a trial.' Citing State v. McCallum, the court clarified that once both parties present credible evidence, the circuit court's role is not to weigh the evidence to determine which is stronger or more convincing. Instead, the court must determine 'whether there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the [old and the new evidence], would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.' The emergence of a legitimate and significant dispute within the medical community concerning the cause of Natalie's injuries, which was not present at the time of trial, means a new jury would be faced with competing credible medical opinions, thereby creating a reasonable probability of a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds's guilt.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standard for evaluating motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, particularly when scientific understanding evolves over time. It reinforces that a trial court's role in assessing the 'reasonable probability of a different outcome' is not to re-weigh credible evidence and decide which side is 'stronger,' but to determine if the cumulative effect of the new and old evidence would likely create reasonable doubt for a jury. This decision provides a critical pathway for post-conviction relief in cases where convictions were based on scientific consensuses that have since shifted or become subject to legitimate debate, offering an avenue for re-evaluating past judgments in light of evolving knowledge and potentially leading to new trials.
